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Abstract. The protection of the global environment is impeded by multilateral
externalities which the international community attempts to bring under control
by entering into international agreements. International agreements, however,
can suffer from non-compliance and free-riding behaviour by sovereign states and
must therefore be enforced and stabilised internationally.
This paper describes instruments for the enforcement and stabilisation of an
international CO2 agreement and evaluates them in the light of economic and le-
gal theory. Economic instruments build on repetition and use utility transfers,
economic sanctions and flexible treaty adjustments. Important legal instruments
are reciprocal obligations and cooperation duties, international funding and
transfer rules, treaty suspension, retorsions and reprisals, treaty revision, and
monitoring.
The paper shows that economic and legal instruments are compatible to a
considerable extent. It develops proposals for the enforcement and stabilisation of
a global CO2 agreement and other multilateral treaties.
This paper originated from a research project about the stability of international environmental agree-
ments. Financial support by the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Sections I, II
and VI were written jointly by all authors, Section III and V was contributed by Johannes Heister,
Section IV by Wolf Plesmann, Tobias Stoll and Rudiger Wolfrum. Johannes Heister and Frank
Stahler are with the Kiel Institute of World Economics, Kiel, Germany, Ernst Mohr is with the Uni-
versity of Sankt Gallen, Switzerland, Wolf Plesmann has been with the Institute of International Law,
University of Kiel, Germany, Tobias Stoll and Rudiger Wolfrum are with the Max-Planck Institute of
Foreign Public and Public International Law, Heidelberg, Germany.I. Introduction
This paper deals with economic and legal aspects of enforcing and stabilising interna-
tional environmental agreements. International environmental agreements comprise
treaties, contracts, international accords, and common policies made and pursued by
sovereign states, possibly with the help of international organisations, in order to cope
with global or international environmental problems. International or global environ-
mental problems include many issues, for instance the loss of species and biological
diversity, the modification of the earth's atmosphere by ozone depleting substances
and emissions of greenhouse gases, the pollution of transboundary river systems and
the oceans.
Among the current global environmental threats the issue of carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions ranks prominently. CO2 emissions are due to the use of fossil energy,
mainly coal, oil and gas, but also deforestation. Curbing CO2 emissions has an impor-
tant impact on national economies as it constrains production and consumption and af-
fects international trade in fossil fuels and in other goods. Since it is irrelevant for the
global climate development which particular countries make the necessary CO2 re-
ductions, and as only a joint approach by at least a number of the world nations has a
chance of success, severe conflicts over CO2 limitations and reduction obligations as
well as over their enforcement, maintenance and progressive development can be fore-
seen.
Any ambitious international CO2 agreement gives rise to an incentive for all coun-
tries to exploit the situation by cheating and free-riding on other countries' emission
reduction efforts. Countries may, for instance, first sign and ratify the agreement, and
later not comply with their obligations and eventually breach the agreement. Or,
countries may simply choose not to participate in the CO2 agreement at all, as they
hope to win a free-rider position. An effective CO2 agreement must face these threats
and provide instruments to cope with them.
How much emission reductions can be agreed upon in CO2 limitation talks and
subsequently be achieved is crucially dependent on the instruments available to deter
non-compliance and rectify actual breaches of the CO2 agreement and on the policiesapplied to deal with free-riders. Hence, finding and providing for instruments which
entice countries to join an international CO2 agreement in the first place and enforce
and stabilise it is an integral part of negotiating and writing the terms of the agreement.
The paper describes and evaluates the dual approach to the enforcement and stabili-
sation of an international CO2 agreement which is entertained on the one hand by eco-
nomic theory and on the other hand by the theory of international law. The paper
shows that the suggested instruments are compatible, as one would expect, in a num-
ber of important respects. But it also points to certain deficiencies in international law
and to certain misperceptions and overlooked mechanisms in economic theory con-
cerning the working of international cooperation.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II describes major problems associated
with worldwide CO2 emissions and with respect to negotiating a CO2 limitation
agreement. Section III deals with the economics of enforcing and stabilising a CO2
agreement and describes the relevant instruments. Section IV contains a description of
treaty enforcement and stabilisation in international law. Based on these, Section V
discusses the identified legal instruments from an economic perspective. The last sec-
tion concludes the paper with a synthesis which attempts to sketch mechanisms for a
stable CO2 treaty and proposes questions for further research.
II. Coping with global CO2 emissions
A. The global CO2 problem
The trace gas CO2 is a non-noxious natural element of the earth's atmosphere and a
major component of the carbon cycle which is the basis for organic life on earth. CO2
is released into the atmosphere when organic matter is burned or decomposes and it is
sequestered again as plants grow and the biomass increases. CO2 in the atmosphere is
a major determinant of the earth's temperature equilibrium as it transforms incoming
solar radiation into heat (the greenhouse effect). By and large, an increase in the at-
mospheric CO2 concentration increases the atmosphere's energy density and its tem-
perature, which can cause major shifts in global climate conditions.The global atmospheric CO2 concentration has been increasing at a growing pace
since the beginning of the industrial revolution, in the wake of which huge fossil fuel
reserves, chiefly coal, oil and gas, became available and were used in industrial proc-
esses, household heating, electricity production and transportation. Recently, the de-
struction of forests, particularly in the tropics, is adding considerably to the atmos-
pheric CO2 stock.
There is a general agreement among climate scientists that an effective doubling of
the atmospheric CO2 concentration from pre-industrial levels, which is expected to
occur under business as usual policies within the next decades, will lead to a mean
global temperature increase in the range of 1.5 to 4.5° C. This increase will have po-
tentially large but varying effects on regional climate conditions.
1 Moreover, it is con-
sidered possible that the earth's climate may not change smoothly with a risk of irre-
versible catastrophes once certain thresholds of CO2 concentration or temperature
levels have been surpassed. Despite the still considerable uncertainties it seems sound
to predict that the impacts of global warming will vary greatly from country to coun-
try, possibly leaving some countries as winners but with the majority of countries
standing to lose.
The costs of abating CO2 emissions are substantial.
2 At present, there is no feasible
end-of-pipe technology for CO2 emissions. Although the use of scrubbers for CO2 and
the storing of the removed carbon may become technically feasible in the future, the
1 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Impact Assessment Working Group
finds, for instance, an ambiguous impact on agriculture and forestry in terms of global
production, but potentially severe shifts in regional fertility, severe stress on natural eco-
systems due to the speed of change, shifts in regional water supply and demand, and an in-
crease in natural hazards (draught, flooding, storms and cyclones etc.) with potentially
devastating impacts especially on the poor in semi-arid areas, coastal lowlands and on is-
lands of some Third World countries, which all could lead to unprecedented migratory
pressure. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change: The IPCC
Impact Assessment (eds. W.J. McG. Tegart, G.W. Sheldon, D.C. Griffiths), 1990.
2 Comp., e.g., Nordhaus, "The Cost of Slowing Climate Change: a Survey", 12/1 The
Energy Journal 37 (1991); W.R. Cline, The Economics of Global Warming, Chapter 4 and
5, at 144 et seq., 185 et seq., 1992; Dean and Hoeller, "Costs of Reducing CO2 Emissions:
Evidence from Six Global Models", 19 OECD Economic Studies, Special Issue: The
Economic Costs of Reducing CO2 Emissions 15 (1992).technology would be very costly in money and energy efficiency terms. Hence, reduc-
ing CO2 emissions must largely rely on economising on carbon input, either by im-
proved energy efficiency and/or by carbon substitution (replacement of coal by natural
gas etc.) and/or by reducing demand for energy services.
Carbon emissions from fossil fuels vary greatly between countries in absolute
quantities as well as per capita and per unit of GDP.
3 The different reliance of coun-
tries on carbon fuels, their different energy needs and varying energy efficiency and
their differing states of economic development imply that the present and future costs
of reducing CO2 emissions vary greatly between countries. This adds to the conflict
potential in CO2 limitation talks and treaty implementation, in particular between de-
veloped and developing countries,
4 but also between industrial countries (OECD) and
oil exporting countries (OPEC) and between various other groups of countries.
B. An international CO2 agreement
The earth's atmosphere can be described as a global environmental medium which is
shared by all countries. Its use as a recipient for CO2 emissions by individual countries
deteriorates climate conditions of other countries, too. Thus, CO2 emissions are a
public bad for the international community. In economic terms, CO2 emissions pro-
duce external costs, which are not borne by the polluter but by third parties. External
costs are typically not taken into account in benefit-cost analyses of individual states,
which merely balance the cost of reducing their emissions with the benefit which ac-
crues only to them. In case of CO2 the domestic costs of emission abatement are sub-
stantial whereas the benefits which can be bought by own reductions are hardly no-
3 The United States released 5,020 million tons of energy related CO2 in 1990 and holds a
world share of 23.27 per cent, followed by Russia and China with 2,400 million tons and
11.13 per cent each (Japan 1,060 mil. t and 4.91 per cent, Germany 1,039 mil. t and 4.82
per cent, European Community 3,180 mil. t and 14.74 per cent, OECD 10,400 mil. t and
48.21 per cent). Whereas the US emitted 19.97 tons of CO2 per capita in 1990, India had
only 0.72 tons per capita. Whereas China needed 5.78 kg of CO2 in 1990 to produce one
US Dollar of GDP (1985 prices), Japan spent only 630 grams (US 1.09 kg, Germany
1.34). See OECD/IEA, Climate Change Policy Initiatives, at 28 etseq., 1992.
4 See, e.g., Lembke, "Umweltpolitik in der Nord-Siid-Dimension: UNCED 1992 und
danach", 5 Zeitschrift fiir angewandte Umweltforschung 322 (1992), Zimmermann,
"Okonomische Aspekte globaler Umweltprobleme", id. 310.ticeable for most countries since their share in global CO2 emissions is simply too
small.
5
External costs of CO2 emissions have a correspondence in external benefits of
emission reductions. A unilateral reduction of emissions by one country can be seen as
the production of an international public good since the benefit of a smaller atmos-
pheric CO2 concentration accrues as an external benefit to other countries too.
Moreover, such external benefits may even lead countries to cut back on their own re-
duction efforts since the problem becomes relatively less pressing. Theoretically, CO2
abatement by one country or a group of countries can even be overcompensated by in-
creased emissions elsewhere in the world if higher domestic costs, e.g. a CO2 tax, shift
production to countries with much higher CO2 emissions per unit of output, as for in-
stance, China. Therefore, from a purely national point of view, it is not in the interest
of most countries to reduce their CO2 emissions more than marginally. Consequently,
their abatement efforts remain much below the global optimum which would take all
external effects of national emission policies into account when fixing individual
countries' emission targets.
To overcome the non-cooperative behaviour of self-interested states and implement
national CO2 policies which maximise the world net benefit requires an international
coordination mechanism, which - in the absence of a world central authority - must
link each country's effort to reciprocal foreign efforts and thus make benefits supplied
depend on benefits received. Such a link could be an international CO2 agreement
which specifies a cooperative CO2 reduction strategy and emission levels for each
participant or an equivalent emission allocation mechanism.
The conclusion of treaties as a means of a regulatory international environmental
policy is an important though not the only element in the development of international
law, which has addressed questions of environmental protection in the broadest sense.
Their origins reach far back into history. There exist new elements related to the envi-
The great majority of countries have a share in world total CO2 emissions (21,570 mil. t.,
1990) of less than two per cent, e.g. Italy: 1.91 per cent, see Climate Change Policy
Initiatives, supra, note 3.ronment already at the level of rules and basic international legal principles and cus-
tomary international law.
6 Those elements comprise responsibilities of states for trans-
boundary air pollution,
7 basic principles on the use of transboundary environmental
media within and outside the domain of state sovereignty,
8 and the claim to regulate
the use of these media also with respect to third parties.
9
These lines of development are less clear-cut than the international treaty law. But
they are equally part of the international legal system and thus belong to the legal
framework conditions of the relations between states. They do not only influence the
behaviour of individual states in the field of the environment by way of command-
ments and prohibitions but they also shape, most extensively and in a complex way,
the legal environment in which countries conclude and implement treaties. Just as pri-
vate contracts concluded under a national legal system, international treaties cannot, in
their legal relevance, be looked at in isolation. Their meaning and implications unfold
only when they are seen in light of the legal system. In this case this is the interna-
tional legal system.
An analysis of international environmental agreements must take account of this
fact in two respects. On the one hand, the particularities in the structure of the interna-
tional legal system must be taken into account when the legal meaning of an agree-
ment is examined. On the other hand, it must be observed that legal developments with
respect to environmental matters are not restricted to international treaty law, but also
6 Comp. Heintschel v. Heinegg. In: K. Ipsen et al., Volkerrecht, Introduction to Chapter 13
at para. 2-9 (3rd edition, Munchen, 1990).
7 , Compare the decision of the arbitration court in the Trail Smelter Case of April 16, 1938
and of March 11, 1941, RIAA III, 1911 et seq. and 1938 et seq. and the decision of OLG
Saarbriicken of 1957, NW II (1958), 752, which obliged a French coal pit to pay damages
to a German citizen who was harmed by smoke and coal dust, and which the court based
on the French damage compensation law.
8 E.g., the arbitration decision in the Lac Lanoux case, RIAA XII, 281; see also Andrassy,
"Nachbarrecht und Wassernutzung". In: F.A. v.d. Heydte, I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, St.
Verosta, K. Zemanek (eds.), Volkerrecht und rechtliches Weltbild, 55 at 55 et seq., 1960.
See also the arbitration decision in the Gut Dam case, ILM 8 (1969), 118 et seq. Concern-
ing areas outside the realm of state sovereignty see the "Antarctic Treaty" of 1959.
9 See here the "Antarctic Treaty" of 1959, which may constitute a so called "objective re-
gime", which obliges also those countries which are not parties to the treaty. Comp.
Fischer. In: Volkerrecht, supra, note 6, at § 12 para. 34.pertain to rules and basic principles of international law, and that such legal develop-
ments influence the conclusion, content and validity of treaties.
International treaties are agreements that are concluded between sovereign states
with the will to be legally bound by the treaty and the obligations stipulated therein. In
legal theory, sovereignty is the prerequisite which enables states to enter into binding
agreements, and this includes the possibility that states give up parts of their sovereign
powers by ratifying international treaties. The rules which govern treaty relationships
between states are laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
The will to be legally bound does, of course, not imply that the parties in reality al-
ways comply with their obligations. But, since treaties are built on the principle of
reciprocity, i.e. they stipulate reciprocal rights and obligations to generate mutual
benefits, the parties to an agreement usually have an original interest in complying
with their obligations. This is obvious in many international treaties that deal with
situations of bilateral exchange, e.g., the exchange of goods in international trade, al-
though the rights and obligations themselves may be framed in a multiparty treaty,
e.g., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Bilateral reciprocal treaties are comparable with so called exchange contracts under
civil law, e.g., a procurement contract. It is the only purpose of performance in such
contracts to secure counter-performance, e.g., payment, in return for the performance
due (quid pro quo). Thus, performance and counter-performance point into opposing
directions — they are reciprocal — and their proportions is a result of the market
process.
But the pattern of bilateral reciprocity does not carry through to international envi-
ronmental treaties which regulate multilateral externalities. Such treaties are distinct in
character in so far as the exchange reciprocity is much less perfect since with multilat-
eral externalities reciprocity is necessarily multilateral too. Consequently, a state that
breaches or abstains from a CO2 agreement nevertheless enjoys the benefit of the joint
cooperative efforts of those other states that comply with the agreement. Reciprocity,
interpreted as an ongoing relationship of equal exchange, in which the participation of
the other partner is conditional on compliance by the first and, hence, non-complianceproduces its own punishment, does not exist here. A country that joins an already large
agreement coalition and pays the price of cooperative CO2 reductions would get much
less in return since it already receives the biggest part of the agreements benefit as a
free lunch. Hence, it has little, if any, incentive to join. Moreover, the same argument
holds for a country that has the choice not to comply with the CO2 agreement of
which it is a member.
Hence, other than in the case of exchange contracts under civil law, which are made
to achieve opposing individual interests, environmental agreements are characterised
by a common purpose and by parallel contributions. As a rule, the purpose of such
agreements consists in protecting a common environmental medium. To that end, the
states which are party to the agreement usually commit themselves equally to refrain
from polluting the environmental medium or to reduce pollution.
A comparison of such constellations with contractual patterns in civil law draws at-
tention to partnership contracts and similar agreements (joint ventures, cooperations,
etc.).
1
0 Such contracts rest on the notion of cooperation, in which the participants
make contributions in order to jointly achieve a common goal. Here, the proportion of
the parties' contributions is subject to very different notions of equity and fairness
compared to the assessment of the proportions between performance and reward in ex-
change contracts. The yardstick for the latter case is that performance and counter-per-
formance must be equivalent.
1
1 However, in cooperative cases, which are of interest
here, the proportion of the parties' contributions are not exclusively determined by the
rule of equal performance. Important are rather notions of equity and fairness, ele-
ments of which are the interest of each party in the achievement of the common goal,




0 Comp. D. Medicus, SchuldrechtH, at 216 et seq., 5th edition, 1992.
1
1 ta. note 13 at 210.
1
2 Compare, for instance, the sharing of costs in the "Convention for the Protection of the
Rhine against Pollution by Chlorides" of 1976, in which the Netherlands, due to their in-
terest in the success of the agreement (the desalination of the Rhine), was committed to
pay 34 per cent of the costs of a desalination project in Alsace, whereas France, the major
polluter, was to pay only 30 per cent of the costs.The question of equity in an ambitious global CO2 agreement is indeed vital for en-
listing sufficient support from all kinds of states. There are several studies which focus
on the issue of an equitable distribution of gains from joint CO2 abatement and on
possible bargaining outcomes in CO2 negotiations.
1
3
But the standard economic concern is the quest for a cost-effective international
CO2 abatement policy, which minimises the global costs of achieving a given emis-
sions target. Important instruments for a cost-effective global CO2 policy are tradeable
permits (or CO2 quota trading) and an international CO2 tax.
1
4 Grubb proposes a sys-
tem of international CO2 quota trading in which CO2 quotas are initially allocated to
states on a population basis.
1
5 This would allow to handle the equity and cost-effec-
tiveness issues with only one instrument. Other researchers consider a system of inter-
national or harmonised national CO2 taxes with transfer payments between countries.
However, history shows that large wealth transfers between countries have hardly any
chance in real world treaties. Instead, and despite the inefficiencies implied, most in-
ternational emissions reduction agreements, e.g., the ECE Protocols on SO2 and NOX,
function with some kind of non-transferable reduction quotas, which are in principle
equal for all signatories.
1
3 See, e.g., Welsch, "Equity and Efficiency in International CO2 Agreements". In: E. Hope
and S. Str0m (eds.), Energy Markets and Environmental Issues: A European Perspective,
211, 1992; WelsCh, "Inequality Aspects of Alternative CO2 Agreement Designs", 16
OPEC Review 23 (1992); Rose, "Reducing conflict in global warming policy: The poten-
tial of equity as a unifying principle", 18 Energy Policy 927 (1990); Barrett, "Reaching a
CO2 Emission Limitation Agreement for the Community: Implications for Equity and
Cost-Effectiveness", European Economy: The Economics of Limiting CO2 Emissions,
Special edition No. 1 - 1992, 3; Bohm, "Distributional Implications of Allowing Inter-
national Trade in CO2 Emission Quotas", 15 The World Economy 107 (1992).
1
4 See, e.g., J.M. Epstein and R. Gupta, Controlling the Greenhouse Effect: Five Global
Regimes Compared, Brookings Occasional Papers, The Brookings Institution, Washington
DC, 1990; Hoel "Efficient International Agreements for Reducing Emissions of CO2",
12/2 The Energy Journal 93 (1991); UNCTAD (ed.), Combating Global Warming: Study
on a Global System of Tradeable Carbon Emission Entitlements, UNCTAD/RDP/DFP/1,
1992; OECD (ed.), International Economic Instruments and Climate Change, 1993.
1
5 M. Grubb, The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets, The Royal Institute of
International Affairs, London, 1989.10
Other contributions take a more comprehensive look at possible CO2 agreements,
1
6
and discuss institutional options for negotiating and administering a global climate re-
gime.
1
7 Few authors deal with the stability of a GO2 abatement coalition,
1
8 and ex-
plore compliance and enforcement issues in a global CO2 regime.
1
9
The Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was signed during the
United Nations Conference on Environnient and Development (UNCED) in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992, is the beginning of a worldwide climate policy. Formally, the Climate
Convention is designed as a framework convention in the style of the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985 and the ECE Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979, and it needs completion by future
climate protocols. But negotiators did succeed in stipulating that developed countries
must take measures which are aimed at stabilising their emissions on the 1990 level
and at reducing them to an earlier level until the year 2000. (Note the deliberate
vagueness in specifying targets. If pursued seriously, this obligation results in a rather
arbitrary and probably inefficient emission reduction quota for each country.)
Moreover, no reduction obligations were agreed upon for developing countries.
Instead, developing countries can expect financial and technological support within the
framework of the Global Environmental Facilities (GEF). Other obligations like re-
search, reporting and regular discussions are more of a preparatory nature and aim at
facilitating the intended follow-up conferences and more serious decisions on CO2 re-
1
6 E.g., The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets, supra, note 16; W.A. Nitze, The Green-
house Effect: Formulating a Convention, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1990.
1
7 E.g., K. Kaiser, E.U. von Weizsacker, S. Comes, R. Bleischwitz, Internationale Klimapo-
litik: Eine Zwischenbilanz und ein Vorschlag zum Abschlufi einer Klimakonvention, For-
schungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur AuswSrtige Politik, Bonn, 1991.
1
8 E.g., Barrett, "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements", 46 Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers (N.S.) 878 (1994); A. Bauer, Der Treibhauseffekt: Eine okonomische
Analyse, at 160-86, 1993.
1
9 E.g., Barrett, "Free Rider Deterrence in a Global Warming Treaty". In: OECD (ed.),
Convention on Climate Change: Economic Aspects of Negotiations, 73, 1992; Ress, "Ex
Ante Safeguards Against Ex Post Opportunism in International Treaties: Theory and
Practice of International Law", 150 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,
279(1994).11
duction targets which are called for by the Climate Convention's explicit aim to stabi-
lise global climate conditions.
But a meaningful CO2 agreement which includes all countries is difficult to achieve
because of the pervasive free-rider incentive that was described above. If free-riding is
possible by not signing an agreement it becomes ever more attractive with every addi-
tional country that joins the CO2 abatement coalition. Whether joining or abstaining is
more profitable depends on the characteristics of each country's CO2 abatement cost
and benefit function. Thus, before joining a CO2 treaty, each country must decide
whether its benefit from cooperation is larger than its free-rider benefit, and each
(potential) CO2 abatement coalition must determine which share of the net benefits it
wants to offer to yet hesitating countries and which other strategies and instruments it
can apply to induce reluctant countries to join. Hence, agreeing on a CO2 treaty is a
bargaining process between all potential parties.
In addition to luring or coercing states into joining the CO2 agreement, a large in-
itial participation can also be achieved by making the treaty's coming into force subject
to a high initial ratification rate. This is a usual practice in international treaties which
guarantees early participants a certain minimum benefit and confronts every hesitating
country with the risk of an all-or-nothing outcome so that the free-rider benefit is by
no means certain.
2^ Hence, it may be better for them to join. However, this approach
merely transforms the problem of free-riding into a problem of enforcing the treaty
after ratification. Obtaining a meaningful and stable CO2 agreement may therefore de-
pend on the ability of states to credibly commit themselves to their treaty obligations
and on the ability of the parties to enforce the treaty's terms with respect to members
and non-members.
C. The need for treaty enforcement and stabilisation
An international agreement is stable if the contractual relationship continues to exist
and the obligations laid down therein are observed. Although sovereign states are ca-
2
0 Black, Levi, Fellow, and de Meza, "Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation
for Tackling the 'Greenhouse Effect'", 60 Economica 281 (1993).12
pable of concluding legally binding agreements, evidence suggest that this does not
preclude them from behaving non-compliant.
2
1 For every practical decision, the sov-
ereignty of a state is also the condition which allows each state to behave opportunisti-
cally and always in accordance with its proper interests, which may include the viola-
tion of a legally binding treaty. This is due to the fact that, unlike national legal sys-
tems, the international system lacks any superior authority which can enforce the legal
order in general and, more specifically, contract obligations by means of a supreme
power. The notion of sovereignty is therefore used in economic theory to indicate the
fact that a state, when choosing from the set of possible actions, will take at any time
only the costs and benefits of its action into account, and can never be induced, prior
or after entering into an agreement, to take an action which it would not choose freely
when taking the related costs and benefits into account. Such costs and benefits can
depend on contractual relations. But contracts and treaties can only influence the be-
haviour of a sovereign state in so far as they affect the costs and benefits of each pos-
sible action. This implies that sovereign states, as seen by economic theory, are inca-
pable of credibly committing themselves to any effectively binding obligation, because
no state, as long as it remains sovereign, can relinquish pursuing the national interest
and behaving opportunistically in any future actions.
Hence, under conditions of state sovereignty, even treaties which have been duly
ratified and which are in force remain always in jeopardy unless they are self-enforc-
ing. Self-enforcing treaties are designed and equipped with appropriate instruments
and mechanisms in such a way that a continued interest of all signatories to remain a
party to the treaty is ensured. This can be achieved by making use of existing real-life
interdependencies between states, which are characterised by the existing options for
2
1 Well known are cases of non-compliance with the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling and with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), e.g., trade in ivory and rhino horn. Comp. on
the effectiveness of international environmental agreements, e.g., P. Sand (ed.), The
Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Existing Legal
Instruments, 1992.13
mutual actions. It is the aim of this study to uncover such options so they can be used
in a CO2 treaty as enforcement and stabilisation instruments.
Although the question of compliance with and enforcement of a CO2 agreement is
closely related to the above question of the agreement's existence, size and extension,
the situation is nevertheless somewhat different since with the existence of a CO2
treaty, countries have different strategies, which lead to different net benefits and to
different stabilisation and enforcement instruments. One difference concerns the fact
that states, as members of a CO2 agreement, are confronted with an ongoing relation-
ship in which their partners may not (be able to) react instantaneously to a violation
but can alter the nature of the future relationship which would then have negative ef-
fects on the violator too. The difference is obvious when considering international law.
International pressure, for instance economic sanctions, may be perfectly legal when
invoked against a non-compliant country, but the same instruments can be illegal when
applied against a country which has never become a party to the agreement. Also the
economic stakes for applying sanctions may be of different size, depending on whether
a non-compliant country had to expect their use as a member of the treaty or whether
they are applied as an unjust interference with a foreign country's policies with the
possibility of due legal reactions.
In economic theory, the rationale of breaching a international agreement can be de-
scribed as follows. When a country's government considers whether breaching the
CO2 treaty or complying with it would be the most beneficial option, it makes a com-
parison between the net present value of both options. The present value is the dis-
counted net benefit of all future periods. Generally, a sovereign state can be presumed
to renege on the CO2 treaty whenever the present value of breaching it exceeds the
present value of complying with its terms. Although at first, a country may have joined
a CO2 agreement in the belief that being a party to the agreement is clearly a better
choice than not joining, reasons may emerge subsequently which induce this country
to violate the agreement or quit participation in it. Such reasons may be:
• The opportunity to take advantage of the CO2 treaty's existence by becoming a free-
rider: When a country which has already ratified the CO2 treaty realises that, after14
more countries have joined, it would be more profitable to leave the treaty, it may
rationally decide to violate or revoke it. This incentive to defect is particularly pro-
nounced if a treaty comes into force only on the condition that a certain minimum
number of countries ratify it. In this situation, it may be better for some countries to
join first than to have no agreement at all, and seek to sneak out again later on when
the treaty's existence is not endangered by its defection. The possibility to free-ride
on other parties' efforts is the dominant reason for this type of non-compliance and
treaty breach.
The difficulty to adjust the CO2 agreement's abatement obligations quickly to a
changing number of members: If the remaining parties to the agreement are unable
to react and adjust their abatement efforts to the new situation of fewer coalition
members immediately or at least in the long-run, then a non-compliant country may
enjoy a temporal or permanent advantage. This advantage stems from the fact that
the remaining countries continue to sustain a too tight CO2 emission level, which
was adequate for the larger coalition, but which would no longer be in their com-
mon interest after the first country's defection. To take advantage of this reaction
rigidity is particularly tempting for those members which have a high time prefer-
ence since their future benefits of continued common CO2 abatement weighs rela-
tively little. But it is also conceivable that a country deceives its partners and joins
the treaty with the secret intention to renege later in order to take advantage of the
remaining parties. Hence, the existence of a reaction time-lag gives also rise to an
incentive to breach the CO2 treaty.
A considerable shift in the bargaining power of participating countries in the course
of time and/or due to the gradual implementation of the agreement: If the relative
bargaining power of a participating country grows in the course of time it may
eventually try to realise a bigger net benefit by violating the agreement with the in-
tention to induce renegotiations of obligations. Such a shift in the bargaining power
of a participating country is possible, for example, when the relationship undergoes
a fundamental transformation as a result of the agreement's implementation. This
may occur, for instance, if some parties irreversibly implement the agreement as a15
front end investment such that they have nothing to offer later, which disturbs reci-
procity when the remaining countries are to catch up. This is, for instance, the case
in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, in which de-
veloping countries are granted a grace period of ten years. Another example is the
possibility that a country capitalises future benefits provided by the agreement, for
instance by using financial transfers obtained for reducing CO2 emissions in the
future as collateral for raising international debt in the present. Once that debt is
raised, the remaining incentive to produce further CO2 reductions in the future is
weak. Irreversibilities cause this type of breaches of a CO2 agreement.
• Changes of the relevant circumstances that result in a disadvantage for certain
member countries: Such changes may be unexpected and can result as a conse-
quence of initially wrong predictions and estimates of costs and benefits, or because
of a sudden lack of authority to implement and enforce the agreement domestically.
But also a CO2 agreement that is based on expected net benefits may not be ful-
filled by a country for which the implicit risk of the agreement materialises in a bad
state of nature, for instance because its realised costs are higher or its damages of
global warming are lower than average, so that the net benefit of complying with
the agreement becomes negative. These breaches of a CO2 agreement are caused by
learning effects.
The following section discusses economic instruments which the international
community can employ to enforce and stabilise a CO2 treaty.
III. Treaty stabilisation and economic theory
A basic paradigm, which is often used to describe international relations in the frame-
work of non-cooperative game theory, is the simple prisoners dilemma. It describes a
situation in which two parties have the choice to cooperate or not. The prisoners di-
lemma is characterised by net benefits for both parties such that it is always better for
each of them not to cooperate whatever the other does, although they were both better
off if both did cooperate.16
£)ue to the externalities of CO2 abatement, joint CO2 abatement resembles the pris-
oners dilemma. But it also differs in some aspects which influences the bringing about
and sustaining of cooperation: First, a large number of countries is involved. This in-
duces free-riding. Second, the abatement costs and benefits of countries differ and may
be interdependent. Third, countries are not equal in size. Fourth, they can choose from
continuous strategies, namely the various degrees of abatement efforts or violations
and other actions, e.g. trade measures. Fifth, they are uncertain about the outcome of
their actions. Sixth, CO2 abatement is a repeated process.
The following discussion of economic stabilisation instruments is based on the as-
sumption that a breach of a CO2 treaty always produces economic gains for the non-
compliant party if the remaining parties continue with their cooperative behaviour.
Hence, we are here only concerned with economic considerations which can be put in
benefit-cost terms of the various strategic options at hand. Any stabilisation instrument
must therefore aim at counter-balancing gains obtained by a breach of the CO2 treaty.
Avoiding possible gains from non-compliant behaviour is possible by designing the
agreement in such a way that the occurrence of situations in which the non-compliance
option may be chosen is avoided or minimised. An adequate sharing of the gains from
cooperation by wealth transfers could achieve this. Furthermore, parties to a CO2
agreement can react to violations of the agreement ex post, e.g. by effectively punish-
ing the non-compliant partner with reciprocal non-compliance or with economic sanc-
tions. A necessary condition for the success of future punitive reactions to non-com-
pliance is, however, that the non-compliant state or government does not discount the
future too heavily, so that future costs can have a sufficiently large impact on today's
decisions.
Economic stabilisation instruments can further be subdivided into internal and ex-
ternal instruments and flexible adjustments to the agreement. Internal stabilisation in-
struments are those which are directly tied to the accomplishment of the agreement's
purpose, in particular by making own future CO2 reductions conditional on the effort
and behaviour of other parties. External instruments are those which apply means that
are external to the direct CO2 abatement obligations, for instance sanctions and17
monetary transfers. Finally, adjustments of the agreement in due time before non-
compliance can induce countries to abstain from violations of the agreement and to ac-
cept the new obligations and implement them.
The following Section III.A deals with the possibility of a stable coalition under
various assumptions. Section III.B describes internal stabilisation strategies. Sections
III.C through E are concerned with external stabilisation instruments (transfers, sanc-
tions, cross-default mechanisms). And Section III.F discusses possibilities for a flex-
ible CO2 agreement and the notion of a dynamic agreement.
A. Stable coalitions
Models on the formation of environmental coalitions between sovereign states have
been proposed by several authors. In a model with identical countries Barrett shows
that cooperation of more than three countries is only stable under the following condi-
tions:
2
2 Each country's marginal abatement benefits must be decreasing in global re-
ductions so that their non-cooperative abatement efforts are interdependent; and the
CO2 reduction coalition always maximises its joint net benefit and re-adjusts its
abatement efforts when a country joins or leaves. Joining is interesting since every
new member benefits from additional reductions of the old members. But with each
new member the free-rider benefit increases so that the incentive to join is decreased.
Therefore, the size of the coalition remains necessarily limited.
2
3 Stability in the sense
of Barrett is achieved when no single country wants to join or leave.
Barrett finds that a large coalition is only possible if the difference in net benefits
between cooperation and non-cooperation is small; if it is large so that full cooperation
would be very profitable only a very small coalition can exist.
2
4 He identifies the first
2
2 Barrett, "International Environmental Agreements as Games". In: Riidiger Pethig (ed.),
Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources, 11, 1992; Self-
Enforcing International Environmental Agreements, supra, note 18.
2
3 A similar result holds for heterogeneous countries, too. See S. Barrett, Heterogeneous
International Environmental Agreements, CSERGE Working Paper GEC 93-20, Center
for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment, University College
London, 1993.
2
4 See Barrett, "Economic Analysis of International Environmental Agreements: Lessons for
a Global Warming Treaty". In: OECD (ed.), Responding to Climate Change: Selected18
case with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. In this
treaty a large number of countries agreed on substantial CFC reductions most of which
would have been made unilaterally, too. He identifies the second case with an interna-
tional CO2 agreement in which the cost-benefit ratio is very much smaller than in the
ozone case and the free-rider effect has much more weight.
In a model proposed by Bauer countries have different size in terms of their CO2
emissions.
2
5 She shows that even with constant marginal benefits large coalitions are
possible if one assumes a stepwise process in which ever larger bilateral coalitions are
formed which consist of countries or subcoalitions of similar size. The model is driven
by the fact that a coalition of two countries is stable whereas a coalition of three is
never stable. Hence, it is never profitable for a country to leave a coalition of four
members — i.e. a coalitions of two subcoalitions of two countries — since its partner
in the subcoalition would then quit, too. This effect renders coalitions of four stable.
(Note that this is a different stability concept than Barrett's.)
The process of stepwise coalition building can continue endlessly, but with the re-
striction that in larger coalitions one country, usually the smallest, can defect without
destroying the remaining coalition. Hence, coalitions of seven or thirteen and more are
possible and stable — and a rather complicated structure of coalitions of various size
with a few individual free-riders results. Bilateral relations seem to be a catalyst for
forming non-trivial larger coalitions. Bauer identifies this coalition building process
with bi- and multilateral pre-agreement negotiations, in which the conditionality of
participation plays an important role. The increasing size of countries serve to produce
a clear coalition structure in the model as smaller countries profit more from free-rid-
ing than larger ones.
In a model by Black et al. cooperation is driven by the uncertainty of countries
about whether an agreement which requires a minimum number of signatures will
Economic Issues, 109, 1991; S. Barrett, The Paradox of International Environmental
Agreements, mimeo, London Business School, 1991.
A. Bauer, International Cooperation over Environmental Goods, Miinchener Wirtschafts-
wissenschaftliche Beitrage Nr. 92-17, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultat der Ludwig-Maximili-
ans Universitat Munchen, 1992; Der Treibhauseffekt, supra, note 18.19
materialise.
2
6 The countries are uncertain about whether a sufficient number of coun-
tries will sign and ratify the treaty so that it can come into force. Not joining the
agreement is therefore risky and must be balanced against the expected free-rider
benefit. This risk induces countries to participate in larger numbers than under full in-
formation. Critical for this result are the assumptions that countries do not renegotiate
after they failed to reach the minimum number of signatories, and that they remain
committed to the agreement after it has come into force although free-riding would
benefit them more.
Heal demonstrates that cross effects in benefits, technological externalities or fix
costs of abatement can also lead to a minimum critical coalition.
2
7 In this coalition,
each member pursues its non-cooperative abatement strategy. The agreement serves
only to coordinate actions on a higher non-cooperative abatement level that is stable
but would not be attainable by independent moves. Heal chooses cost and benefit
functions which imply a coordination problem in addition to the free-rider problem.
With additional cooperative abatement, the minimum critical coalition would be
smaller.
It is interesting to note that the climate threshold effect, which describes a sudden
and irreversible climate deterioration, could produce a minimum critical coalition in
the sense of Heal. In this coalition, each country would be decisive since without it a
CO2 concentration in excess of the threshold could not be avoided. As a result, the de-
fection of only one member country would destroy the coalition, so that each country
loses the entire coalition benefit when it quits. The threat of the threshold effect may
thus help avoid its consequences.
B. Stabilisation by repetition
In the above models, actions are immediately followed by reactions. But this simplifi-
cation may not be appropriate for describing an international CO2 agreement since in-
2
6 Black et al., supra, note 20.
2
7 G.M. Heal, "Formation of International Environmental Agreements". In: C. Carraro (ed.),
Trade, Innovation, Environment, 301, 1994.20
ternational verification of CO2 abatement is difficult. Explicitly modelling the time
structure may be more realistic. Although the introduction of a reaction delay can in-
crease the non-compliance benefit, repetition can contribute to solving the enforce-
ment and stability problem.
Repetition is a powerful ingredient of cooperative behaviour in prisoners dilemma-
like situations since the sequential nature of cooperation allows to fight back after a
deviation has occurred.
2
8 Repetition reintroduces reciprocity on a higher level since it
ties present and future benefits and/or costs together. A country which considers
breaching the CO2 agreement must thus balance the additional present net benefit of
non-compliance against its future costs when the remaining countries retaliate.
Retaliation may consist in reciprocal non-cooperation in the next or in future periods.
The cost-benefit calculation of a country which considers violating the agreement is
critically influenced by its time preference expressed by the discount rate. A high dis-
count rate gives more weight to present benefits whereas a low discount rate values
future benefits relatively more. Hence, repetition in connection with a sufficiently low
discount rate can secure cooperation when there is always more to gain from continued
cooperation than from a breach of the agreement with subsequent retaliation.
There are a number of internal punishment strategies which consist in realising non-
cooperative levels of CO2 emissions in future periods in response to a breach of the
CO2 agreement by a member country.
Game theory allows to derive this result for infinite horizon games, but not for games with
a finite number of repetitions. In such games punishment is not only impossible in the last
stage but, by backward induction also at all previous stages. Since each party tries to cheat
first, the non-cooperative outcome is played right from the first stage on. See, e.g., Abreu,
"On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting", 56 Econometrica, 383
(1988) for a theoretic treatment, and R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984, for
a computer evaluation of repeated prisoners dilemma strategies. In contradiction to the
theoretically predicted impossibility of cooperation in finitely repeated prisoners dilemma
games, experimental studies of human behaviour show that most people tend to cooperate
until shortly before the final stage of the game. See, e.g., Selten and Stoecker, "End
Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner's Dilemma Supergames", 7 Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 47 (1986).21
1. Trigger strategy
A well known retaliation strategy is the so called trigger or grim strategy. It requires
that all parties pursue cooperative abatement until one party is observed to cheat. In
this case the CO2 agreement becomes void and each country's emissions fall back to
the non-cooperative level forever. An example for the application of the trigger strat-
egy in an international treaty is the Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur
Seals (signed 1957, adopted 1976). It stipulates that each of the four parties to the
treaty (US, Canada, USSR, Japan) can give notice of the treaty's termination whenever
consultations on a violation turn out to be unsuccessful.
The trigger strategy punishes the non-compliant country very effectively. It can
counterbalance relatively large free-rider gains and can thus enforce stable cooperation
between a large number of countries. The size of the abatement coalition depends, of
course, on the discount rate of all countries. Especially those countries with a lower
discount rate will find the free-rider position the more attractive the more countries
have already joined the agreement so that full cooperation need not emerge.
But the trigger strategy does not only punish the non-compliant country. The pun-
ishing countries also suffer when they terminate the agreement and increase their CO2
emissions. Therefore, they have an incentive to renegotiate in order to continue or re-
sume cooperation. Hence, the trigger strategy is not a credible threat. But even worse,
the trigger strategy may be impossible to apply in the CO2 case because the technol-
ogy applied may prevent a return to the pre-agreement emission level. Hence, a coun-
try which wants to leave the CO2 agreement need not necessarily fear its termination
for punishment.
2. Matching efforts
Another punishment strategy concerns the re-adjustment of abatement efforts upon
non-compliance of one country. This is a much weaker stability concept. It is used in
Barrett's model, although not in a sequential moves context. The strategy requires that
a country which deviates from its CO2 abatement obligations is excluded and that the22
remaining countries jointly decrease their efforts somewhat so that the new abatement
target maximises the remaining coalition's net benefit.
Barrett's results with this strategy are hardly promising. They are even less promis-
ing in a repeated moves framework. The non-compliance gains are larger here because
of the detection and reaction time lag. Furthermore, a defection by one country will
prompt entry by another country, which renders the matching strategy worthless. Re-
adjustments do not occur in equilibrium so that every member has an incentive to de-
fect. Hence, punitive re-adjustments require that the abatement coalition is a closed
shop and that the number of members is held down to a suboptimum level. But again,
countries can hardly commit themselves to permanent losses from a suboptimum
abatement coalition. Moreover, the loyal parties to the agreement have an incentive to
renegotiate with the non-compliant country and re-accept it in disregard of its past
violations. If this is anticipated, the agreement becomes inherently instable again.
3. Modified tit-for-tat
Another internal punishment strategy is modified tit-for-tat. This strategy avoids the
incentive to renegotiate. The usual tit-for-tat strategy stipulates that in each subsequent
move each party chooses that action which the other party has chosen in the previous
move. After cooperation has started tit-for-tat is equivalent to the trigger-strategy —
and it suffers from the same deficiencies. Modified tit-for-tat is adapted to a multi-
party agreement. It requires to continue with cooperation until one country defects,
and then to exclude this country and re-adjust emissions among the remaining mem-
bers, and not to forgive and re-admit the non-compliant country before it has paid
damages or made a front end abatement concession. Such a concession could be to go
back to the higher abatement efforts of the old coalition for at least one period, whilst
the other parties remain at the lower abatement level. The re-admitted country's
abatement effort is thus not matched for some time, so that is must bear higher costs
and has a lower net benefit while it produces additional external benefits for the loyal
parties.23
Modified tit-for-tat is interesting as a punishment strategy, because it can eliminate
the gains from non-compliance without, at the same time, inducing the loyal parties to
renegotiate with the violator. This can be achieved by tailoring the front end conces-
sion in such a way that the outcome of renegotiations is always strictly worse for the
loyal parties, whilst paying the concession to be accepted again is always better for the
non-compliant country than permanent exclusion from the agreement. Hence, the
modified tit-for-tat strategy is (weakly) renegotiation proof. Of course, renegotiations
can still become necessary if a change in other circumstances had caused non-compli-
ance.
One may object that modified tit-for-tat is unrealistic in a CO2 agreement, because
CO2 abatement levels are not flexible enough due to technological and political rigidi-
ties. But the strategy need not be restricted to shifting abatement efforts. Much more
subtle renegotiation proof strategies which involve other areas of international rela-
tions like trade are conceivable and may even not be explicit in the agreement. An ex-
ample for an implicit punishment of this sort can be seen in the fact that an unreliable
country has a weaker bargaining position in international negotiations or must accept a
higher risk premium when borrowing from international banks.
C. Transfers
Repetition strategies are not sufficient to enforce a meaningful international agreement
that suffers from severe multilateral externalities. Utility transfers between countries
can play an important role for the stability of a CO2 agreement. But they can have a
destabilising impact, too, if given carelessly.
There are several examples of transfers in international environmental treaties. An
early one is the Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals mentioned
above. In this treaty, Canada and Japan gave up their wasteful practice of catching
seals at sea in return for receiving a share of the annual catch of the United States and
Russia which harvest seals much more efficiently on their breading islands. A more
recent example is the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Fund pays for the incremental costs of implementing24
the Protocol in developing countries. Major countries, namely China and India, ac-
ceded to the Montreal Protocol only after the developed countries had offered to pay
these transfers. Another recent example are the Global Environmental Facilities
(GEF), which pay for CO2-related and other environmental projects in developing
countries which are of a global interest.
One important reason for transfers between member countries of a CO2 agreement
is the fact that their costs and benefits of CO2 abatement differ substantially.
Developing countries concentrate their efforts on economic development instead of
environmental protection. Due to their low per capita income they are reluctant to
substitute low-cost but environmentally harmful technologies by high-cost but envi-
ronmentally friendly ones. Their focus on development issues overrules environmental
aspects in many cases. This pattern seems to hold for CO2 reduction policies, too. The
opportunity costs in terms of a lost increase in economic prosperity are significant for
these countries when they have to bear the corresponding costs of CO2 abatement
alone.
Although these opportunity costs are considered high by developing countries this
does not mean that their costs of reducing CO2 are substantial when compared inter-
nationally. On the contrary, CO2 abatement costs are usually significantly lower in
developing countries. This is mostly due to a very wasteful use of fossil energy re-
sources. A global reduction policy which need not take sovereignty constraints into
account would allocate reductions in a way that would equalise marginal abatement
costs over countries for any given worldwide reduction target. Minimising the costs of
CO2 reductions would require concentrating reduction policies on developing coun-
tries in order to make use of the significant cost differentials. Such a policy would,
however, leave many developing countries worse off if they had to bear the corre-
sponding abatement costs in their countries themselves. Obviously, sovereign coun-
tries would never agree to such a scheme. This is the reason why some kind of trans-
fers are considered necessary for reaching an international CO2 agreement that abates
CO2 emissions at lowest costs. Such a policy would compensate especially those
countries which shoulder a great deal of reductions but benefit only moderately.25
Another reason for making transfers in an international CO2 agreement is to induce
countries to participate which would otherwise free-ride or else would breach the
agreement. Even if costs and benefits of CO2 abatement were identical over all coun-
tries and hence efficiency were not an issue many countries would benefit more from
free-riding than from participating in the CO2 agreement. This is simply because the
agreement exists and other countries engage in CO2 abatement already. In this situ-
ation, transfers which compensate for the loss of the free-rider benefit can be used to
induce more countries to participate. Similarly, such transfers can prevent countries
from breaching the agreement if their non-compliance benefit is insufficient to com-
pensate for the loss of previously received transfers. However, the amount of transfers
needed to induce a further country to join or stay in the agreement increases with the
size of the CO2 abatement coalition. And transfers can even exceed incremental costs
as measured against the non-agreement situation if countries can gain from increasing
their emissions when the rest of the world reduces CO2. Finally, paying transfers re-
duces the interest of the donor countries in the agreement. Transfers can therefore only
be used to stabilise a sizeable CO2 abatement coalition if donor countries can credibly
commit to bearing the double burden of paying transfers and complying with their own
abatement obligations.
Carraro and Siniscalco show that a limited extension of a stable coalition is possible
if the coalition members or the remaining free-riders are committed to making utility
transfers to newly joining countries.
2^ These transfers are self-financed by the addi-
tional benefit from more extensive cooperation. The commitment assumption is, of
course, crucial for the result and not very plausible in the framework of the model. But
it may be justified in a CO2 agreement in which parties can employ sufficient addi-
tional stabilisation instruments.
There are basically three kinds of utility transfers. These are monetary transfers, in-
kind transfers and other concessions (issue linking). Transfers can be given in the
C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco, "Strategies for the International Protection of the
Environment", 2 Environmental Papers 35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM),
Milano, 1992.26
context of various schemes,
3
0 which has different implications for the stability of a
CO2 agreement.
1. Monetary transfers
If donor countries make monetary transfers they can hardly prevent that the receiving
country uses these funds for purposes for which they were not earmarked. Since the
donor knows the non-compliance option of the recipient he will be reluctant to transfer
money unless he can be assured that the recipient's best use of the funds is in line with
global environmental policies. In the case of CO2, however, it is evident that the re-
ceiving countries prefer to use the transfers to tackle poverty or local environmental
problems (which may but need not go hand in hand with global objectives).
Mohr addresses a similar problem which can arise in the context of a system of in-
ternationally tradeable CO2 emission permits.
3
1 Such a system allocates the reduction
of CQ2 emissions in a cost-effective way over countries. Mohr shows that a CO2
agreement which is based on tradeable CO2 permits is burdened with a severe sover-
eignty risk despite the fact that countries may initially receive permits in excess of
their CO2 emissions. For instance, when permits are distributed per capita among
countries, many developing countries can sell permits on the international CO2 permit
market.
3
2 A country may sell its excess permits and then use this income to boost its
economy, which would expand CO2 emissions. Once the country has sold all its ex-
cess permits it loses interest in the CO2 agreement and starts to emit CO2 without pos-
sessing the necessary permits.
To permit only the lease of permits does not solves this sovereignty problem. The
country may then borrow against the future income stream from leased permits which
3
0 Comp, Barrett, "Side Payments in a Global Warming Convention". In: Convention on
Climate Change, supra, note 19, 49.
3
1 E. Mohr, "Global Warming: Economic Policy in the Face of Positive and Negative
Spillovers". In: H. Siebert (ed.), Environmental Scarcity: The International Dimension,
187, at 205, 1990.
3
2 Note that developed countries would not necessarily want to sign an agreement with such a
distribution rule for CO2 permits because the implied transfers could make them worse off
than without an agreement which includes those countries that would benefit from the
permit scheme.27
it uses as collateral and later breach the CO2 agreement when its own emission
schedule tightens. When an opportunistic country must invest in emission reduction or
restrain economic growth in order to service its debt with income from leased permits,
it will rather breach the CO2 agreement and/or repudiate its debtor obligations. A
possible solution would be to restrain permit sales or leasing to such an amount that
opportunistic countries can always cover their emissions. But this conflicts with the
purpose of the permit scheme to minimise worldwide CO2 reduction costs.
Another way to prevent countries to renege on the CO2 agreement would be to
make payments to them apart form their income from selling permits so that comply-
ing is always the better option. This scheme could be supported by an international
CO2 tax and an appropriate sharing rule. But it would also require that one group of
countries can fully commit itself to paying the tax to all opportunistic countries.
Moreover, depending on the number of opportunistic countries, such a tax scheme
would become so costly that the net benefit of the donors from joint CO2 abatement
would probably be negative.
Hence, financing a CO2 reduction project in an opportunistic country directly on
the basis of the (incremental) costs of the project can be a much more attractive policy.
Donor countries can then be assumed to restrict such payments to maximise their own
net benefit from environmental investments in foreign countries. This policy would be
like a restricted CO2 agreement that includes only some (developed) countries which
buy their CO2 reductions where they are cheapest. But such an agreement would be
unable to maximise global net benefit.
Obviously, transfers for CO2 abatement projects must be made on the basis of strict
conditionality. Payments must be made after the accomplishment of the project or
relevant parts of it. Conditional transfers are de facto transfers in kind. They imply a
CO2 abatement policy which is restricted to more or less irreversible investments. This
policy is not necessarily cost-effective, but it can be the best option under conditions
of country sovereignty.28
2. In-kind transfers
This section introduces two donor strategies which guarantee a higher degree of
compliance than monetary transfers do. These strategies are compensations in kind in-
stead of cash and compensations for an irreversible technology.
In-kind transfers can mitigate the sovereignty risk because their retrading potential
is restricted in many cases. Compared to monetary transfers, in-kind transfers cannot
be re-allocated to other purposes without costs. When the recipient must bear signifi-
cant retrading costs an alternative use of the transfer becomes less attractive. If the ret-
rading costs cover the value of the transfer completely any alternative use is impossi-
ble. For instance, the erection of a modern power plant incurs sunk costs because there
is no alternative use. Therefore, a policy of in-kind transfers that replace inefficient
domestic power plants in a foreign country by more modern, energy efficient plants,
would be self-enforcing and stable.
In-kind transfers are always a superior instrument when the receiving country might
behave non-compliant and income effects are "normal" in economic terms.
3
3 In-kind
transfers are applied in many situations in which institutional arrangements cannot
guarantee compliance.
3
4 Therefore, it is not surprising that proposals for global
environmental policies rely heavily on in-kind transfers. The currently discussed "joint
implementation" approach, which is provided for in the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, allows to reduce CO2 emissions abroad by e.g. replacing old with
modern energy technologies.
3
5 Financing modern technology in developing countries
would reduce the global CO2 emissions at lower costs compared to making the same
3
3 See F. Stahler, Pareto Improvements by In-kind-transfers, Kiel Working Paper No. 541,
The Kiel Institute of World Economics, 1992; F. Stahler, Superior In-kind-transfers,
mimeo, 1993.
3
4 See, Pareto Improvements by In-kind-transfers, supra, note 33.
3
5 "Joint implementation" goes back to an earlier proposal by a group of seven large electric
utilities, the E7, who suggested that they should be allowed to fulfil their national CO2 re-
duction obligations by erecting modern power plants in other countries. The E7 consists of
the French Electricite de France, Hydro Quebec and Ontario Hydro from Canada, Tokyo
Electric Power Co. and Kausai Electric Power Co. from Japan, The Italian Ente Nazionale
per l'Energia Elettrica and the German Rheinisch-Wesffalische Elektrizitatswerke.29
reductions in the already highly energy efficient electricity industry of developed
countries. Additionally, it would restrict the danger of non-compliance substantially.
Compensations for an irreversible technology are another option for stabilising in-
ternational environmental agreements. An irreversible technology is an abatement
technology which does not allow to increase emissions again after a reduction has
been made. Irreversibility implies that emissions in the following periods cannot ex-
ceed emissions in the previous period. For example, introducing a low-emission but
capitaHntensive technology can render a switch to another technology prohibitively
expensive. This ratchet effect restrains the non-compliance options of a country which
receives transfers for an irreversible technology because any national reduction policy
is limited by the previous policies.
Stahler demonstrates in a model with transfers that irreversibility can provide
commitment options which render these technologies superior even if they are more
costly than equivalent reversible technologies.
3
6 This result can explain the choice of a
cost-inferior reduction technology which is very capital-intensive. This policy is the
more successful the less the recipient takes the future impact of the irreversibility ef-
fect into account. A high discount rate of the recipient can benefit the donor, because it
decreases the share of the transfer which compensates the recipient for being locked
into an irreversible technology. A high discount rate of a receiving country, which
prevents transfers for a reversible technology, favours compensation policies for very
capital-intensive irreversible technologies.
3. Issue linking
The third transfer strategy consists in linking otherwise separate issues in which the
participating countries have a mutual interest. Concessions in a second environmental
agreement or in trade relations can be a substitute for monetary or in-kind transfers.
Such concessions can be of equal value for the receiving country, but may be much
preferred by the donor country. The 1992 Rio Conference, which was called UN
3
6 F. Stahler, On the Economics of International Environmental Agreements, Kiel Working
Paper No. 600,1993.30
Conference on Environment and Development, seems to have promised such a link to
the developing countries.
Issue linking is easier in bilateral than in multilateral relationships. Folmer et al.
show that the scope for using transfers can be extended by linking up the CO2 agree-
ment with other issues.
3
7 If two country negotiate cooperation in two separate and re-
petitive issues then these issues can be linked in one or two mutually dependent and
even tacit agreements so that each country is allowed an advantage over the other in
one of the two fields. Issue linking does not require financial resources, can help solve
another international problem and can appear more equitable to each party's constitu-
ency. It can be cheaper for both parties when monetary transfers are difficult to make
or bear additional political or economic costs (e.g., raising taxes). The stability of in-
terconnected agreements is secured by the repetitive character of the relationship.
Reneging on one issue would inevitably induce the other country to renege on the
other issue.
A similar result is derived by Cararro and Siniscalco.
3
8 They suggest linking the
CO2 agreement with an agreement on joint research and development (R&D). The
R&D gains are appropriable only by the parties to the agreement and therefore free-
riders do not exist. The link between the two agreements is made by a cross-admission
clause that restricts access to the R&D agreement to the members of the CO2 agree-
ment. Consequently, a breach of the CO2 agreement results in an expulsion from the
R&D agreement. Carraro and Siniscalco show that entering into the linked agreements
is profitable for a large coalition of countries, and perhaps even for all countries. But
they do not show how the cross-admission clause and the punishment strategy of ex-
cluding a non-compliant country from joint R&D can be made credible and why
countries should not exhaust all profitable R&D agreements independently of the CO2
agreement. It seems that the commitment problem reappears here under a different
3
7 Folmer, v. Mouche, Ragland, "Interconnected Games and International Environmental
Problems", 3 Environmental and Resource Economics 313 (1993).
3^ C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco, Policy Coordination for Sustainability: Commitments,
Transfers, and Linked Negotiations, FEEM Working Paper 63.93, 1993.31
cover. Nevertheless, the strategy can be interesting for stabilising a CO2 agreement if
developed countries can credibly commit to the link
3
9 and since developing countries
cannot be taken to build an equally potent R&D coalition among themselves.
D. Sanctions
Another external stabilisation instrument are economic sanctions. Sanctions have been
used widely in non-environment contexts as explicit or implicit threats, and they were
executed in quite a number of cases with variable success in order to support a large
variety of foreign policy goals.
4
0 The use of economic sanctions in environmental
contexts, especially in support of environmental agreements, is still rare.
4
1 One ex-
ample is the USA-Mexican Yellow Fin Tuna case in which the US banned tuna im-
ports from Mexico because Mexican fishermen used fishing methods which caused a
high death rate among dolphins and which were not in agreement with US national
legislation.
4
2 Sanctions based on national legislation (Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments) were also used as effective threats by the US against a number of coun-
tries (Japan, Norway, Spain etc.) which objected to or did not comply with the whaling
quotas of the International Whaling Commission. Recently, the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer stipulated sanctions against free-riders who
are not parties to the Protocol.
4
3 These sanctions take the form of specific trade re-
strictions. They were later extended as part of the non-compliance procedures to those




9 Comp. Section I1I.D on cross-default clauses.
4
0 Comp., G.C. Hufbauer, J.J. Schott, K.A. Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered:
History and Current Policy (Vol. 1), Supplemental Case Histories" (Vol. 2), 2nd edition,
1990.
4
1 A study of the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) identifies 19 inter-
national environmental agreements that use some form of trade sanctions to improve
compliance. See, USITC, International Agreements to Protect the Environment and Wild-
life, at 5-1 etseq., USITC Publication 2351, 1991.
4
2 Note that the the US import restrictions against Mexican tuna were declaired to be not
permissible under GATT rules.
4
3 The trade restrictions against countries not parties to the Montreal Protocol are controver-
sial and awaiting decision by the GATT pannel.
4
4 Annex VI, accepted by Decision IV.5(4) of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the
Montreal Protocol, contains an "Indicative List of Measures that Might be Taken by a32
In the context of international agreements sanctions are intended to work as a threat
which is not actually executed. In fact, their execution is a signal that they have failed
to meet their primary purpose, namely to deter non-compliance. The true effectiveness
of sanctions is difficult to evaluate because there is hardly any empirical information
on the success of explicit or implicit threats against foreign countries. Studies like
Hufbauer et al. on the effectiveness of sanctions are therefore incomplete.
In contrast to transfers, sanctions decrease the net benefit from non-compliance
which reduces the temptation to violate the agreement. Sanctions are attractive com-
pared to transfers since they cause costs only when the agreement is breached. This,
however, will not occur if the threat is effective. Successful sanctions are therefore a
much cheaper stabilisation instrument. Sanctions are only an effective threat if their
impact on the non-compliant country is large enough to offset the net benefit from
non-compliance. Moreover, when the execution of sanctions after a violation is not
certain their impact must be even more severe because the potential violator will base
his decision on the expected impact, which is always smaller.
1. Credibility
Sanctions can only function effectively if they constitute a threat which is credible.
This crucial condition is difficult to meet since economic sanctions do not only hurt
the target country, but usually also have a negative effect on the sanctioning country.
Consider, for instance, a trade embargo. In the wake of the embargo the target country
may suffer because it is cut off from certain imports or must buy elsewhere at higher
prices. But at the same time the former suppliers are cut off from their markets. The
exporting government may therefore refrain from or regret the execution of sanctions.
Due to this adverse incentive the threat of imposing sanctions may not be credible in
Meeting of the Parties in Resect of Non-Compliance with the Protocol". Para. C of the list
reads: "Suspension, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law concerning
the suspension of the operation of a treaty, of specific rights and privileges under the
Protocol, whether or not subject to time limits, including those concerned with industrial
rationalization, production, consumption, trade, transfers of technology, financial mecha-
nism and institutional arrangements." See UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/L.l/Rev.2, at 30 (emphasis
added).33
which case the sanction strategy has no effect. Therefore, sanctions must be made
credible.
Sometimes sanctions can be designed in such a way that their execution is not
costly or is even profitable for the executor, e.g., the suspension of development aid.
Another example is the US-Mexican Tuna case mentioned earlier. The import restric-
tions for Mexican tuna freed American fishermen from foreign competition. As this
allegedly paid a political dividend, the import restriction on its own account was
beneficial in the eyes of the US government. But also trade restrictions which benefit
the economy as a whole are possible, e.g., an optimal trade tariff. However, apart from
usually violating GATT rules, trade restrictions can boomerang if the trade partner re-
taliates, which then leaves both countries worse off. The capacity to retaliate depends,
of course, on the relative strength of the countries involved. Therefore, trade sanctions
are rarely observed between partners of equal economic size, for instance between the
United States and the European Union, but are more frequently used against weaker
countries.
Lobby groups and the public opinion in general can render a threat of sanctions
credible. A government that has the choice to threaten a foreign country either in se-
crecy, using diplomatic channels, or in public can use the media to commit itself to the
threat. This is possible if the government would lose face in the eyes of the electorate
if it failed to execute the threat when this becomes necessary. This effect can be en-
hanced further by stirring up public emotions concerning the case under dispute.
Addressing the public can thus turn an otherwise incredible threat into a self-binding
and therefore credible commitment.
A government that uses a threat can also willingly create a situation in which it is
unable to revoke the execution of the threat. This is, for instance, possible by irrevo-
cably delegating the execution of sanctions to another institution. This technique is
used by the US Congress which has enacted laws that order the administration to take
retaliatory actions against foreign countries which are found in violation of trade or en-
vironmental agreements (Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments). Reinforcing
commitment by such legislation is possible since it usually takes some time for the34
legislator to revoke and replace his previous legislation and since such a move would
erode the legislators' public image and political capital.
4
5 But the power to execute
sanctions may also be delegated to an international body, for instance to a supervisory
board of the CO2 agreement or another international institution like the United Nations
or the World Bank. An international organisation would be particularly suitable for
this task if it has more or less independent authority and if the envisaged sanctions fall
into its field of responsibility, for instance the distribution or denial of grants or credit
to foreign countries.
2. Uncertainty
A commitment to punish another country can hardly ever be made totally credible in a
surrounding in which the costs, benefits and discount rates of countries can vary.
Countries find themselves in a situation of uncertainty. The existence of uncertainty,
however, opens a new avenue to commitment since uncertainty permits the sanction-
ing country to build up a reputation for being tough. Reputation ties a present case of
non-compliance to the future behaviour of the parties in such a way that the costs of
executing sanctions today earn a benefit in the future due to the improved compliance
of the sanctioned party or any other party that observes the sanctions in future periods.
After sanctions have been executed at least once, the probability of a future violation is
decreased or vanishes completely since opportunistic parties have reason to believe
that non-compliance will be answered with sanctions again. Therefore, the net benefit
over time from executing sanctions under conditions of uncertainty may well be posi-
tive, and hence the threat becomes credible.
As in formal reputation models,
4
6 tough governments which will definitely punish
non-cooperative behaviour may exist with a certain probability, for instance, because
4
5 A similar strategy is used by the US in trade negotiations. See J. Bhagwati and H.T.
Patrick (eds.), Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trading Policy and the World
Trading System, in particular Chapter 6, 1991.
4
6 See, Selten, "The Chain Sore Paradox", 9 Theory and Decision 127 (1978); Kreps and
Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information", 27 Journal of Economic Theory, 253
(1982); Milgrom and Roberts, "Predation, Reputatition and Entry Deterrence", id. 280.35
their cost-benefit ratio suggests punishment or they employ other not readily observ-
able commitment instruments. If an opportunistic country believes that some tough
governments exist, the other countries can play on this belief and pretend to be tough,
too, even though they would normally be weak and would rather not execute sanctions
in the situation they face. An opportunistic country will infer from the experience of
sanctions that its opponent is likely to be tough. Consequently, it will refrain from
violating the agreement henceforth or at least it will suppress its tendency to behave
non-compliant since it must reckon with sanctions. Thus, the possibility of building up
a reputation for being tough can serve as a commitment strategy.
The crux of the reputation commitment strategy, however, is that each and every
violation must necessarily be answered with sanctions since otherwise the true weak-
ness of the country that leaves a violation unanswered becomes known. It would lose
its reputation and deterrence capacity with the consequence that violations occur
henceforth and cooperation breaks down. If violations cannot be excluded with cer-
tainty and sanctions merely reduce the probability of future violations somewhat, then
maintaining ones reputation by repeated sanctions can become rather costly.
However, under certain behavioral assumptions also the occasional execution of
sanctions can play an integral part in stabilising international relations.
4
7 This is pos-
sible if violators react mechanically to the experience of sanctions or non-sanctions
with reducing or increasing their frequency of non-compliance. It is then the sanction-
ing country's best strategy to maintain a certain level of reputation, measured as the
probability of non-compliance, by answering only each second violation with sanc-
tions.
4
8 Hence, not only the credible threat with sanctions but also their execution can
be a stabilising element in international relations.
4
7 J. Heister, Sanctions and Reputation, mimeo, 1993.
48 The mechanical reaction of potentially non-compliant countries implies that governments
have imperfect or no recall, i.e. that past experience vanishes. Otherwise governments
could learn and would recognise a discrepancy between their expected probability of sanc-
tions and the true (alternating) frequency of sanctions.36
3. Multilateral sanctions
The application of the reputation commitment strategy to a multilateral CO2 agree-
ment could rely on single large countries. But it could be more successful to establish
an enforcement institution, in which strong countries with a sufficiently large sanction
capacity decide and act jointly. This institution can rely on the reputation commitment
strategy if it consists of the same members for a sufficiently long time. The members
of the enforcement institution should be considered tough with a high probability.
Reputation can be preserved to some extent in a multilateral setting without always
executing sanctions if acquiescing cannot be observed by other countries. Another
possibility consists in deliberately failing to detect violations or in treating them as mi-
nor offences that do not justify sanctions. But this requires that monitoring and com-
pliance rules are vague. An example for ambiguity (and flexibility) is the provision for
"scientific" whaling in the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.
Violations are often overlooked in the case of human rights. And monitoring provi-
sions are rare in international environmental agreements as most treaties rely on self-
reporting. Moreover, violations are often negotiated with the offending country in se-
crecy and offer numerous possibilities for compromise. Such procedural provisions
may well contribute to the stability of an international agreement in that they obscure
violations and maintain the illusion that most countries comply with the agreement and
that "real" violations will certainly be answered with countermeasures. Thus, certain
misperceptions and the lack of information on other parties actions can save an agree-
ment that is insufficiently enforced from erosion.
Successful trade sanctions often depend on joint implementation by as many coun-
tries as possible. Countries which do not participate in a trade embargo do not only
safe the costs of execution. They profit twofold in that they leave the enforcement of
the CC»2 agreement to other countries and increase their profit from trade with the
country under embargo. As experience shows, free-riding on international sanctions or
otherwise circumventing and evading sanctions is tempting. This behaviour often ren-
ders economic sanctions much less effective. Under such conditions, the threat of37
sanctions; becomes incredible again, although individual countries may be committed -
and thus international sanctions may not deter violations of the CO2 agreement.
Trade sanctions against a non-compliant country must therefore be complemented
by a credible commitment to execute the punishment by (almost) all countries. If this
is impossible, the CO2 agreement must contain provisions that force the execution of
sanctions on all countries whether they are members of the CO2 agreement or not. A
self-enforcing and therefore credible threat is possible in a multilateral environment if
the CO2 agreement specifies that sanctions are directed against both, non-compliant
countries and all countries that do not execute the sanctions.
4
9 This double sanction
strategy is successful if the number of parties to the CO2 agreement or rather their
economic weight in international trade is sufficiently large relative to all countries and
if countries do not collude in shirking. The strategy works since every country,
whether party to the CO2 agreement or not, is better off when it joins the sanctions
coalition. Every county will implement the sanctions, because otherwise it would have
to suffer the same sanctions itself. The critical number of parties to the agreement
which is sufficient to make such a comprehensive sanction scheme credible depends
mainly on the kind of sanctions envisaged and on the economic weight of the targeted
country.
The same strategy can also be applied to enlarge an existing CO2 abatement coali-
tion of already sufficient size. This is possible if all countries which free-ride on the
CO2 agreement, whether they are signatories or not, are considered non-compliant
countries and are therefore subject to sanctions. It seems that this strategy was success-
fully used to induce cooperation by hesitating countries in the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, as the Protocol was supported by a coalition
of countries which was large in terms of their production of CFCs and related
products.
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9 See J. Heister, Who Will Win the Ozone Game? On Building and Sustaining Cooperation
in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Kiel Working Paper
No. 579, 1993.38
4. Related instruments
Another way of making a sanction scheme credible is to compensate countries for their
costs of executing them. This requires the establishment of a transfer fund. It could
have a dual purpose. The fund could be used to assist the members of the CO2 agree-
ment in implementing their obligations. This would contribute to stabilising the
agreement. The fund could also be used as a source for compensation payments in the
case that sanctions against a non-compliant country become necessary. This would
render the threat more credible since no sanctioning country would suffer directly and
relative to the status quo, since the contributions to the fund would be sunk costs from
the perspective of an individual country. Furthermore, due to the enhanced credibility
of the threat sanctions are less likely, which allows that more of the funds can be used
for compliance assistance.
The resources of this fund may not only consist of voluntary or contracted contri-
butions from donor countries. It may also include collateral or other values which must
be given into the custody of the fund when joining the CO2 agreement. Collateral is
virtually a bond or hostage that serves to guarantee continued cooperation and compli-
ance since in the case of a breach of the agreement it is forfeited and becomes avail-
able for compensating those loyal parties which suffer from the violation and execute
sanctions. Rejoining the agreement would, of course, require renewing collateral pay-
ments so that this way of making a commitment binding could, in addition, be renego-
tiation proof. A country which breaches a CO2 agreement which contains such provi-
sions would automatically execute sanctions against itself.
Another kind of bond is a country's international reputation for being a reliable
partner in international relations and business. This goodwill is put at stake when a
country ratifies an agreement and it is forfeited when the country defaults - with the
possible consequence that the country must pay a higher risk premium to foreign part-
ners. A similar stability instrument is the requirement to implement the provisions of
the CO2 agreement into national law. This would open the possibility of prosecuting
violations In national courts. And it would virtually take hostage the reputation and
trustworthiness of the country's juridical system.39
Finally, the linking of international agreements with each other by way of a cross-
default clause, which is described in the next section, can be interpreted as a special
sanctions instrument, the triggering of which lies in the hands of the opportunistic
country itself.
E. Cross default mechanisms
A cross default mechanism takes advantage of the multi-dimensionality of interna-
tional relations. If a country maintains international relations in two or more areas a
contract violation by this country can induce a reaction of foreign contractual partners
not only in that area where the violation occurred. For example, if a country violates
an environmental agreement it may be punished by a credit embargo if it also main-
tains a debtor position in international capital markets. Under a cross default mecha-
nism a sovereign is deemed to be in default of two or more contracts even if only one
of these is violated. Thereby she loses the option of discriminating between contracts
such that now she can only violate or honour all the contracts covered by a cross de-
fault mechanism. She must therefore face sanctions in more than one area and thus has
an increased incentive to honour contracts. Hence such a cross default scheme can be
used to stabilise international contractual relations.
In doing so one must, however, bear in mind that a country's various international
contracts rarely link it to one and the same foreign contractant. Instead, a government
maintains international contracts with a variety of foreign contractants. For example,
the other contractant in an international environmental agreement signed by a govern-
ment may be an international environmental agency or another government, whereas it
maintains a debtor position with respect to a foreign private consortium of banks.
Hence under a cross default mechanism a party may be supposed to impose sanctions
against another country although it has not suffered from the contract violation itself.
A cross default mechanism covering a sovereign therefore requires a cross default
contract between at least two foreign parties each of which maintains a contract with
the same third and sovereign party. This cross default contract specifies the actions all40
the parties to it must undertake if anyone party to it suffers from a contract violation of
the sovereign with whom each of them is contractually linked.
As in principle a cross default contract itself may be subject to a sovereignty prob-
lem a cross default mechanism can only improve on a situation if the cross default
contract is less burdened by an enforcement problem than the set of international con-
tracts it is supposed to stabilise. This is for example the case if all the parties to a cross
default contract are private and subject to the jurisdiction of a single country.
Mohr analyses a situation where a country is in an international debtor position and
has a contractual relationship with a foreign or international environmental agency.
5
0
This model shows that in the absence of risk the environmental treaty can be com-
pletely stabilised by a cross default contract between the agency and the lender(s).
Responsible for this stabilisation is the self-interest of lenders which under the cross
default mechanism have an incentive to ration loans such that the lender does not vio-
late the debt contract and consequently the environmental treaty too. This result
hinges, however, on the certainty assumption as under risk and competitive conditions
lenders accept a default risk if compensated in credit markets by a sufficiently large
risk premium.
In another paper, Mohr and Thomas take account of risk.
51 They show that a cross
default contract pools the individual sovereignty risks faced by the parties to the cross
default contract, such that for low enough individual risks risk pooling reduces the
sovereignty problem faced by the parties to the cross default contract. Furthermore, if
credit markets anticipate risk pooling conditions exist under which risk pooling also
increases the welfare of the sovereign. A further property of risk pooling by a cross de-
fault contract is that when applied to an international environmental treaty and inter-
national debt it induces a debt-for-nature swap undertaken by the sovereign in collabo-
ration with foreign lenders.
5
0 Mohr,"International Environmental Permit Trade and Debt: The Consequences of Country
Sovereignty and Cross-Default Policies", 3 Review of International Economics 1 (1995).
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1 E. Mohr and J. Thomas, Pooling Sovereignty Risks: The Case of Environmental Treaties
and International Debt, Kiel Working Paper No. 568,1993.41
F. Flexibility, renegotiations and dynamic agreements
Flexibility with respect to the fulfilment of obligations is a totally different approach to
the stability problem. At first sight, flexibility allows a party to the agreement to ap-
propriate gains which otherwise would be considered a violation. Legalising any vio-
lations would imply that a breach of the agreement can legally never occur. Flexibility
can therefore be a somewhat dangerous provision in international agreements since
flexible obligations lend themselves to being exploited unnecessarily and at the ex-
pense of all other parties which can be taken to reciprocate with violations. Thus
flexibility tends to erode the agreement. Therefore, if flexibility is used as a stabilisa-
tion instrument it cannot be applied at random but needs clear rules and limits.
At second sight, flexibility can transform an agreement from a set of static obliga-
tions that may be violated into a dynamic process in the continuation and sustainability
of which all parties are interested. The fact that adjustments are possible in a flexible
regime increases the willingness of countries to join the agreement despite important
uncertainties associated with the CO2 problem. Furthermore, if adjustments are an in-
tegral part of the agreement all obligations and rules remain subject of permanent ne-
gotiations in which parties have something to gain, for instance additional reductions,
and something to lose, namely the breakdown of the process and the end of agreement.
Promises and actions, procedural rules and mutual observation can be tied together
in a flexible and dynamic agreement in such a way that parties can react to arising
problems quickly and jointly and with the aim to stabilise ongoing cooperation. The
dynamic CO2 agreement can then transform into a self-referential, self-reproducing
(autopoietic) system
5
2 and may evolve into an international regime which obliges
countries to participate and which — if comprehensive and powerful enough — can




2 B. Marin, Contracting Without Contracts: Economic Policy Concertation by Autopoietic
Regimes Beyond Law?, EUI Working Paper No. 278, European University Institute,
Florence, 1987.
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3 Compare, for instance, the development of the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the
Ozone Layer. Compare also the European Union with its integrationist thrust, which was
strong enough to survive repeated crises.42
1. Flexible obligations
The most basic way of building flexibility into a CO2 agreement is to anticipate the
potential difficulties which countries may have when fulfilling the agreed obligations.
These obligations can then be made dependent on the development of the relevant
conditions which determine the capacity or willingness of countries to comply with the
agreement. One possibility to introduce a certain flexibility into a CO2 agreement
would be to index each country's abatement obligations with the development of its
population or GNP. Or one may use as index the CO2 related shifts in a country's cli-
mate and environmental conditions. The chosen indices should, of course, be as far as
possible exogenous to the policy options countries have so that there is no incentive to
manipulate the situation so as to relieve ones CO2 abatement burden. Indexed obliga-
tions may, for instance, imply increased or reduced CO2 quotas or they may lead to
higher or lower transfer payments.
Another possibility for making a CO2 agreement more flexible is to allow a tempo-
rary suspension of agreed obligations (escape clauses) in order to bridge a difficult
situation. Or the agreement may define excusable violations, perhaps granted on the
condition that the country accepts to make compensations, e.g. future higher CO2 re-
ductions, for its deviations from the terms of the treaty.
But the use of flexible obligations is only possible in relatively narrow limits.
Flexibility cannot induce a country to enter or stay in a meaningful abatement coalition
if the gains from free-riding are far greater than from joint abatement. Moreover, the
indexation of obligations can have perverse results. For instance, to secure the contin-
ued participation of a country which learns that it is on the whole favourably affected
by climate change would require that the climate index reduces that country's abate-
ment obligations since its bargaining power has grown and the free-rider option has
become more attractive. Conversely, a country which learns that its climate change
damages are more severe than expected can be burdened with stricter abatement obli-
gations since its outside option deteriorates.43
2. Renegotiations
Renegotiations lead to an adjustment of the CO2 agreement to which all members
agree. In the context of treaty stabilisation, renegotiations are a spontaneous bargain-
ing processes in a situation which is critical for the stability of the agreement or for the
further participation of a particular country. The aim of renegotiations is usually to
comfort one or several parties by adjusting the agreement in such a way that the causes
for a potential breach of the agreement are eliminated. This does, of course, not ex-
clude the use of a threat with sanctions or other countermeasures in the negotiations in
order to put pressure on a non-compliant country. But successful renegotiations usu-
ally imply a redistribution of the net benefits from cooperation and possibly also an
adjustment of the agreed obligations for all parties.
Many international treaties contain provisions for arbitration and conciliation pro-
cedures. These procedures can be renegotiations if they do not only aim at interpreting
the agreement and determining whether a country is in compliance or not and in as
much as they can modify obligations. The general problem with the arbitration and
conciliation instrument is that it is very blunt when a country is determined to breach
the treaty unless it is granted an additional advantage which the other parties are not
willing to give. A country which rejects the results of arbitration and reconciliation
and is not cooperative in renegotiations cannot be kept within the bounds of the
agreement with this instrument.
Renegotiations which are provided for in an agreement make the agreement ma-
nipulable. Treaty revisions become a problem when they do not take their cause into
account. If previous treaty violations are ignored in renegotiations and treaty revisions
and thus de facto accepted this constitutes an incentive to realise the gains from non-
compliance. The option to renegotiate can thus be destabilising. A similar problem oc-
curs if in implementing the treaty irreversibilities emerge which shift the bargaining
powers of the parties. For instance, irreversible front end performance by one side and
treaty revisions are mutually exclusive provisions in treaties since front end perform-
ance is no rational option if the other side can later renegotiate. But treaty revisions are
reasonable and necessary to cope with new and exogenous information and develop-44
ments which could otherwise motivate a treaty breach, e.g., environmental damage,
technical progress, population growth.
A country may, for instance, first ratify the CO2 agreement and, after having gained
a better bargaining position, try to obtain a more favourable sharing of the cooperation
gains through forcing all parties into renegotiation by small violations of the agree-
ment. One may think of the possibility that a government promotes a domestic anti-
abatement movement. This can be a bargaining commitment to which partners must
give in in renegotiations. Or the country may apply short-lived and reversible abate-
ment technologies whereas all other countries use long-lived and irreversible abate-
ment strategies. The bargaining power then shifts to the technologically more flexible
country which can threaten to quit whilst all other countries are stuck in irreversible
technologies. Therefore, due to the possibility of renegotiations all countries may have
an incentive to distort their abatement choice and select more costly but reversible
abatement strategies in order to gain a better position in renegotiations.
3. Dynamic agreements
The more recent international environmental agreements have turned their permanent
development and adjustment into a matter of principle. Examples for these dynamic
agreements are the ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(1979) with its four protocols,
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4 the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone
Layer (1985) with the Montreal Protocol (1987) and its adjustments and amendments,
and the Rio Convention on Climate Change (1992). The characteristic feature of most
protocols to these agreements is that they stipulate an emission target which is to be
reached by each party in a given time frame and that they provide for regular meetings
of the parties to review and adjust the agreement. Hence, countries are tied into a re-
peated bargaining situation which allows to take regular account of any shifts in their
The protocols concern the final establishment of the European Monitoring and Evaluation
Program (EMEP) (1984), and the emissions of SO2 (1985), NOX (1988) and hydrocarbons
(1991), see infra, note 98.45
bargaining power and of possible causes for violations and to condition further pro-
gress on behaviour in past periods.
Adjustments in dynamic treaties are not spontaneous. They are a rule-driven proce-
dure for continuously adjusting and improving the treaty design, its mechanisms and
obligations. Dynamic treaties are particularly well suited for dealing with insecurities
in the treaty's targets which are due to scientific and economic uncertainties or the
motives of the parties. A dynamic treaty permits to integrate its enforcement and sta-
bilisation into an almost permanent negotiation process. It can be more stable for sev-
eral reasons, e.g., the speeding-up of the parties' reactions to non-compliance. The
reputation and loyalty of the parties is more significant in dynamic agreements because
previous behaviour influences the next round of negotiations. New treaty obligations
can depend directly on the fulfilment of old obligations which produces a ratchet effect
if fulfilment is irreversible.
Stahler shows in a model with two countries which apply an irreversible abatement
technology that a permanently adjustable agreement which provides for repeated steps
into the direction of full cooperation is self-enforcing although full cooperation is
never reached.
5
5 Self-enforcement in this agreement is ensured by the fact that in each
period each country can win more by proceeding further in future rounds than by
breaching the agreement and thereby ending cooperation on the achieved level. The
international negotiations on the protection of the ozone layer illustrate this stepwise
process. The Climate Change Convention is still very weak with respect to CO2 re-
duction obligation but it can be expected that those obligations will be tightened
gradually by the Conference of the Parties once previous obligations have successfully
been met.
Another aspect of dynamic agreements is the fact that, due to the permanent proce-
dural cooperation, unilateral enforcement is replaced with an institutionalised joint
management of the agreement and its stability. Parties act together in monitoring,
evaluating and deciding on achievements and default and in taking remedial steps to
5
5 On the Economics of International Agreements, supra, note 36.46
secure compliance if necessary. This is important because agreements which suffer
from multilateral externalities lack bilateral reciprocity and can therefore not be en-
forced unilaterally.
Finally, the institutionalised form of discussions and negotiations, which character-
ises dynamic agreements, allows parties to learn from each other, disseminate infor-
mation, pass on technical knowledge, build up a common body of normative expecta-
tions and rules and create an atmosphere of trust. All this facilitates the building of a
consensus and the settlement of disputes within the framework of the agreement.
5
6 A
dynamic international agreement, which is a dynamic process instead of a static set of
obligations can establish an autopoietic regime which replaces and functions as the
non-available centralised authority in governing international environmental affairs.
Autopoietic regimes are self-referential, self-reproductive and hence self-stabilising.
5
7
All or some subgroups of the parties to a dynamic regime can develop leadership in
enforcing the regime by establishing structures which bind less reliable parties and by
threatening potential violators and free-riders which would stand alone against the re-
maining parties if they attempted to challenge the accepted rules of the game. Hence,
dynamic agreements constitute process oriented stability systems which beef up and
can give a new meaning to the rather static stability and enforcement instruments
which were discussed in the preceding sections. A dynamic agreement can employ
these instruments in a coordinated manner in order to sustain and expand a meaningful
CO2 abatement coalition.
IV. Legal aspects of treaty stabilisation
The point of departure of this study is the concept of stability of international agree-
ments. Elements of this stability are transfer rules, sanctions, treaty adjustments and
revisions, and monitoring. It has already been shown that the concept of stability of
international agreements, when understood in this way, is closely connected in many
5
6 Comp. Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal
Systems", 1 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 35 (1990).
5
7 Comp., Contracting Without Contracts, supra, note 52.47
ways with legal considerations. Sanctions and treaty adjustments or treaty revisions
have frequently been dealt with in legal writing, often so from the point of view of
tackling the stability problem.
5
8 The term itself has less often been used, mostly in the
context of considerations concerning the design of resources and investment contracts
in developing countries.
5
9 In a problem oriented view of international environmental
law, the stability of a treaty can be defined as the continued existence of the contrac-
tual relationship plus compliance with the treaty. The following sections investigate
elements of stability from a legal point of view.
A. Transfer mechanisms in international environmental treaties
Transfer mechanisms play an important role for the stability of international treaties.
They are based on the idea that the maintenance and stability of international environ-
mental regulation necessitate the acceptance of environmental obligations by individ-
ual states. This acceptance can be brought about by granting them an advantage in the
form of a transfer of funds or, e.g., technology. The term "transfer" is of economic
origin and is not part of the legal language of treaties. But in many cases, treaties con-
tain rules which, under functional aspects, can be considered transfer mechanisms.
6
0
The cooperation principle which governs international environmental agreements
suggests taking as a transfer any advantage for an individual party which deviates from
the rule of equal contributions and which allows to take certain differences between
countries into account and yet achieve the common goal.
5
8 See, e.g., Horn, "Die Anpassung langfristiger Vertrage irn internationalen Wirtschaftsver-
kehr". In: H. Kotz, W. Frhr. Marschall von Bieberstein (eds.), Die Anpassung langfristiger
Vertrage 9, at 9 et seq., 1984.
5
9 Camp., Ch. Kirchner, E. Schanze, F.G. von Schlabrendorff, A. Stockmayer, Th. Walde,
M. Fritsche, R. Patzina, Rohstofferschlieflungsvorhaben in Entwicklungslandern, Teil 1:
Interessenrahmen, Verhandlungsprozefi, rechtliche Konzeption, 1977; E. Schanze, M.
Fritsche, Ch. Kirchner, F.G. von Schlabrendorff, A. Stockmayer, W. Hauser, M. Bartels,
W. Mahoney, Rohstofferschliefiungsvorhaben in Entwicklungslandern, Teil 2: Probleme
derVertragsgestaltung, 1981.
6
0 For. example, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany committed themselves in Art. 7
of the "International Convention on Protection of the Rhine from Pollution by Chlorides"
of 1976 to pay 70 per cent of the construction costs of a desalination plant in Alsace.48
1. Possible forms of transfer mechanisms
Looking at international environmental agreements from this perspective, very differ-
ent regulatory approaches can be found that serve the aim of securing the common
goal despite differences in the individual participants' points of departure. However,
clearly defined and quantified payment obligations benefiting certain states, which in
principle can be thought of as a model for transfer mechanisms, cannot be detected. In
particular, the following regulatory structures can be observed, the transfer function of
which appears highly questionable in some cases.
a) Cooperation obligations, in particular technical cooperation
Provisions which oblige all parties to cooperate in order to achieve the common goal
are widespread in international environmental agreements.
6
1 In as far as these duties
are further specified, cooperation in the field of technology and science are usually
emphasised, which on the one hand often pertain to technical assistance,
6
2 and on the
other to the passing-on of scientific information.
6
3 Although they may neither be
6
1 Comp. Art. 2 (2) lit a, c, d of the "Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer" of
1985; Art. 2 of the "Mexico-U.S. Agreement to Co-operate in the Solution of
Environmental Problems in the Border Area" of 1983; Art. 3 of the "Convention on the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area" of 1974; Art. 13 of the
"GA-Resolution 3281 (XXIX) Charta of Economic Rights and Duties of States" of Dec.
12, 1974; Principle 1 and 2 of the "Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the
Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States" of 1978; No. 8 of the "Montreal
Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-
Based Sources" of 1985; Art. 7 (1) of the "International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation" of 1990; Art. II 3 (a) of the Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals" of 1979.
6
2 Comp. Art. 202 of the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" of 1982; No. 9
of the "Montreal Guidlines for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution
from Land-Based Sources" of 1985; Art. 7 (1), Art. 9 (1) of the "International Convention
on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation" of 1990; Art. 9 of the
"International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes"
of 1972; Art. 11 of the "Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against
Pollution" of 1976.
6
3 Comp. Art. 4 of the "Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution" of 1979;
Art. 8 of the "International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-
operation" of 1990; Art. 11 of the "Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
against Pollution" of 1976; Art. 4 of the "Protocol Concerning Pollution Emergencies in
the South Pacific Region" of 1986; Art. 16 of the "Mexico-U.S. Agreement to Co-operate49
specified qualitatively nor quantitatively, such cooperation duties are by no means le-
gally irrelevant. Furthermore, they are often effective in practical terms.
Understanding the significance of cooperation duties is difficult. It appears almost
certain that they are not yet a title to a specific contribution to cooperation, particularly
payments. Their significance rather is that they oblige states to a specific behaviour. It
can be derived from this obligation to cooperate that states may not leave unanswered
or decline to consider any demand for cooperation from another state. They also may
not break off existing cooperation relationships without reason. Positively one may
conclude that states are obliged to consider requests for cooperation and to give a rea-
soning for their decisions.
The contents of such cooperation obligations is therefore a cooperative behaviour,
which may include financial or technological transfers. As a general rule, this transfers
take place between the relevant bodies of the states concerned and are limited to their
specific abilities and resources.
6
4 As far as technologies are transferred, these are
usually those employed in the public sector. They usually do not include industrial
know-how.65
It already follows from this characterisation that cooperation obligations are not
transfers in the economic sense. Their purpose is exclusively to buttress the common
protective goal and the primary protective obligations directed thereon. Obligations to
cooperate, therefore, cannot be understood to offer other states a clear and definable
advantage, which may qualify as a transfer.
in the Solution of Environmental Problems in the Border Area" of 1983; Art. IX of the
"Revised Canada-U.S. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality" of 1978, amended by
the Protocol of 1987.
6
4 Comp. Art. 6 of the "Mexico-U.S. Agreement to Co-operate in the Solution of
Environmental Problems in the Border Area" of 1983; Principle 7 of the "UNEP Draft
Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the
Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More
States" of 1978.
6
5 Comp. Art. 12 of the "Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
from Ships and Aircrafts" of 1972; Art. 13 (2) of the "Convention for the protection and
Development of the Marine Environment of the wider Caribbean Region" of 1983; Art. 6
of the "Mexico-U.S. Agreement to Co-operate in the Solution of Environmental problems
in the Border Area" of 1983.50
b) Differentiated environmental standards as transfers?
Quite often, international environmental treaties contain differentiated provisions ac-
cording to which states which are parties to the treaty are subject to different protec-
tion standards and are given different deadlines for implementing and complying with
those standards.
6
6 These different obligations, which are often justified by differences
in countries' economic capabilities, give relieve or further burden the individual states
in different ways. However, they can hardly be taken to correspond to the concept of
transfer rules, because the different willingness and ability of states to bear environ-
mental protection obligations are not taken account of by specific privileges, but rather
by reduced obligations. If, however, those provisions relate to a stock of resources
which already has a monetary value, such as, for example, fisheries, the suspension of
protection standards virtually constitutes an allocation of exploitation rights. This does
indeed correspond to the concept of a transfer.
c) Differentiated financial contributions to the financing of common tasks
International environmental treaty regimes often provide for some functions to be per-
formed jointly and in cooperation. Those functions may include stock-taking, research-
ing, and monitoring. Funding those operations is usually based on the rules of contri-
butions to international organisations which are proportional to the gross national
product of the countries in question. But these rules cannot necessarily be qualified as
transfer mechanisms. This is because the financial contribution of states cannot be un-
derstood to aim at granting advantages to states in order to compensate for the bearing
of certain environmental obligations.
6
6 Comp. Art. 2 of the "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution Concerning the Control of Emission of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary
Fluxes" of 1988, which, although it obliges all parties to reduce their emissions to the level
of 1987 or some earlier year, stipulates, in fact, very different abatement levels; Art. 5(1)
of the "Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer" of 1987. Compare
also No. 1.1.1. Annex 1 of the "Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine
Environment against Pollution from Landbased Sources" of 1985.51
d) Transfer of environmentally friendly technologies
Rules on the transfer of technologies are relatively frequent, particularly in the more
recent environmental treaties.
6
7 These include, among other things, also rules covering
industrial technologies.
6
8 However, these rules usually do not go beyond an obligation
of states to promote such a technology transfer. In addition, they frequently require
that the transfer should take place at market conditions.
6
9 Therefore, such provisions
cannot be deemed to comply with the notion of transfers as applied here.
e) Funds supporting structural change in the member states — contributions and
disbursement
Special funds in support of structural change in individual member countries, which
are set up occasionally in more recent treaties, come much closer to the concept of
transfers.
7
0 Those funds are financed by differentiated contributions just as mentioned
above.
7
1 The distributed funds are earmarked for undertaking the necessary structural
adaptations in the countries in question. These provisions can be characterised as
transfer mechanisms.
2. Transfers outside of treaties
The relatively rare appeaiance of transfer mechanisms in international environmental
treaties does not imply that such transfers do not take place. They can be provided
6
7 Comp. Art. 144 and Annex III Art. 5 of the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea" of 1982; No. 5 of the "Cairo Guidlines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound
Management of Hazardous Wastes" of 1987; An. 9 II of the "International Convention on
Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation" of 1990.
6
8 Comp. Annex III Art. 5 (2) - (4) of the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea" of 1982.
6
9 Comp. id. at para. 3 a.
7
0 Comp. the "International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damages" of 1971, amended by the Protocols of 1976 and
1984; Art. 15 of the "UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage" of 1972; Decision 11/8 Financial Mechanism of the "1990
Decisions, Adjustments and Amendments to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer"; Art. VI.6 of the "Framework Convention on Climate
Change" of 1992; Art. 19 of the "Convention on Biological Diversity" of 1992.
7
1 Comp. Art. XIX (3) of the "Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources" of 1980.52
without any legal provisions, solely in the political context, and they can be connected
with expectations that have no legally but possibly a very strong politically binding ef-
fect. The nature and size of such transfers cannot be identified in detail since the ex-
ternal observer usually lacks the necessary information about the exact connections to
other political issues and subjects and about the exact nature of a transfer. The crucial
difference between transfers based on mere political considerations and a legally
binding commitment consists in the fact that the assertion of claims, the maintenance
of obligations and the treatment of violations is subject to different rules. A relation-
ship based on mere political understandings turns out to be stable only as long as the
political circumstances under which it was made remain constant. Any shift in the
relevant decision factors in foreign policy puts the commitment in doubt.
3. Evaluation: The significance of legally binding transfer rules
Unlike mere political commitments, legal obligations are based on the will of the par-
ties concerned to be bound by law. The binding force of a legal obligation therefore is
based on legal authority and is independent of the subsisting political will of a state to
act accordingly. Of course, as has been shown above, states may decide not to comply
with a legal obligation for some reason. They will, however, be much more reluctant
to do so as is true for mere political commitments. Committing a breach of an interna-
tional legal obligation seriously affects the reputation of a state and therefore may
cause much higher political costs. As far as transfers, e.g. development assistance etc.,
are concerned, potential donor states so far have been reluctant to accept any legal ob-
ligations upon their contributions. In this perspective the legally binding transfer pro-
visions as stipulated in modern international environmental treaty regimes mark a
substantial progress.
B. Sanctions
The mere possibility of executing sanctions in response to contract violations can con-
tribute in a wider sense to the stabilisation of treaties in reducing the probability of
such a violation, merely by the possibility of their application.53
In private law a party to a contract has a variety of possible reactions at hand to
remedy a contract violation of another party to the contract.
7
2 In principle the purpose
of such reactions is to carry on the contractual relation and to persuade the non-com-
pliant party to fulfil its obligations. Private law primarily seeks to urge contracting
parties to stand by their obligations. The termination of a contract is only admissible if
performance of an obligation is proven to be definitely impossible or is finally and in-
contestably refused. Sanctions in private law amount to compensation to be paid for
economic losses resulting from non-compliance.
7
3 In this context, sanctions in general
mean that the non-compliant party has to bear the losses which the other party has suf-
fered due to non-compliance.
7
4 Here it becomes once more evident that the private ex-
change contract can be compared only with difficulties with an international environ-
mental treaty. This is because a damage due to a violation of an environmental treaty
can only be proven under certain circumstances (damage of health, life, property,




In the reality of international law the possibilities for reactions to treaty violations
are based on the principle of the sovereignty of states. States have a variety of reme-
dies at hand in this regard. In applying those remedies, e.g. sanctions, they have to
comply with only a few general principles of international law. More specific rules
about the sanctions to apply may, however, be stipulated in the relevant treaty itself.
7
6
It must be borne in mind, however, that whenever such means of reaction have been
codified their purpose usually is to mitigate the general rules.
7
7 Provisions as to the
admissibility of sanctions, the kind of measures to be taken and their intensity have so
7
2 Comp. §§ 275 etseq. and 325 etseq. Biirgerliches Gesetztbuch (BGB).
7
3 Comp. § 325 para. 1 BGB.
7
4 Comp., e.g., § 280 BGB.
7
5 Comp. the Amoco Cadiz case. See I. Luge, Haftung als notwendiger Teil des internationa-
len Meeresumweltschutzes, at 120,1989.
7
6 As, for instance, the principle of proportionality. Comp. Fischer, supra, note 9, at § 57,
para. 45.
7
7 In order to avoid this result, the "Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long
Driftnets in the South Pacific" of 1989, Art. 3 (3), expressly allows the contracting states
to take measures which are much tougher than those suggested in the Convention.54
far only rarely been codified in environmental treaties. Therefore, the general interna-
tional law rules apply.
In general international law three different kinds of sanctions exist. These are sus-
pension, retorsion and reprisal.
1. Treaty suspension
Under certain circumstances, a treaty may be suspended under international law. This
is to mean that the relevant international obligations are temporarily or finally dis-
missed. At first glance, this may not be deemed to be a reasonable method for treaty
stabilisation as it, in effect, amounts to the contrary. If, however, state parties to an
international agreement have an interest in its continuation, the possibility that other
state parties may opt for suspension in cases of non-compliance may well qualify as a
sanction in the sense discussed here. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VC) permits under certain conditions such a suspension by one or several parties to
an international treaty. In principle, however, it refers in Art. 57a to the contractual
stipulations. The parties to a treaty are thus free to agree on particular rules for treaty
suspension. Art. 60 regulates the suspension of a treaty after a violation. It is required
that this violation must be a major violation of the treaty. Art. 60 (3) defines a major
violation as a rejection of the treaty which is not admissible under the VC or as a vio-
lation of a stipulation of the treaty which is essential for attaining its objective. Beyond
that, Art. 60 allows for a partial or total suspension of a treaty. The state possessing the
right of suspension is free in choosing either. It is, however, bound to respect the
principle of proportionality. In the context of a treaty violation this implies that a party
can refuse to honour the treaty only to an extent which corresponds to the degree of
non-compliance by the other party. In the context of environmental treaties in particu-
lar it will, however, be difficult to bring about reciprocity exactly.
Furthermore, Art. 60 distinguishes between bilateral and multilateral treaties. In the
case of a bilateral treaty, of course, the other party may rely on treaty suspension. In
the case of multilateral treaties several possibilities exist. In the case of a substantial
violation of the treaty all states being a party to it, except of course the violating state,55
can jointly decide on a partial or total suspension of the treaty. Furthermore, a state
which has exceptionally suffered from the treaty violation can cancel rights and duties
emanating from the treaty vis-a-vis the violator. This stipulation, however, applies
only to those multilateral treaties which are structured that way that it can reasonably
be divided into a number of single relationships between contracting parties. In the
case of so called integral treaties such disaggregation is impossible and other rules
apply. For those cases Art. 60 (2) c stipulates that each party to the treaty, except the
one which is responsible for a major violation, can execute a partial or total suspension
vis-a-vis each other party to it. However, this procedure can only be applied if the
treaty is such that a major violation by one party changes the situation of each party
fundamentally. A point in case are disarmament treaties.
7
8
It is doubtful, however, whether these procedures can be applied to environmental
treaties. They can be easily applied only in the case of mere cooperation and informa-
tion treaties. However, when the subject of the treaty is the fixing of production proce-
dures or emission limits then the obligations involved cannot in a strict sense be ful-
filled "between" the parties to the treaty. For illustration, it would be equally absurd to
cease applying an environmental standard at home as a reaction to a treaty violation of
another state just as it would be to cease observing human rights at home if they were
violated in another state.
A suspension of an environmental treaty is therefore only feasible in the case of in-
formation or cooperation treaties or if financial contributions are stipulated which can
be cancelled in the case of a treaty violation.
2. Retorsion and reprisal under general international law
States are in principle free in the design of their relationship to other states. The only
limit to be observed under international law is the use of force. This freedom contains
the right to entice other states to a certain behaviour by imposing a disadvantage on
them. In international law these kinds of actions are called retorsion and reprisal.
7
8 Comp. Heintschel v. Heinegg, supra, note 6, at § 15 para. 86.56
There is a ranking in between the retorsion and the reprisal.
7
9 The retorsion is a less
severe instrument compared to reprisal. It consists of an unfriendly act which, how-
ever, does not contradict to international law. It is supposed to remedy an equally un-
friendly yet legal action of another state. For instance, the termination of development
aid which is based on a mere political commitment qualifies as a retorsion. A retorsion
can also be applied to address a violation of international law. It is, however, charac-
terised by the fact that it is not itself a violation of international law.
A reprisal is an interference in particular rights of a state which has caused a viola-
tion of international law by another state whose international legal rights have been
violated. The purpose of a reprisal is to induce the violating state to a rectification or a
behaviour in compliance with international law. A reprisal is only constrained by the
prohibition of force under the UN Charter, Art. 2 (4).
8
0 The preconditions for a repri-
sal are the following:
1. A reprisal may only be executed by a state which has directly suffered from a
previous wrongdoing. A violation of the rights of a state is given whenever an-
other state does not honour a treaty. However, there exist obligations in interna-
tional law which have an erga omnes effect. This is to say that they are binding
upon all states. The question arises which party has the right to enforce such obli-
gations. In this case, collective decisions and actions brought about by some ob-
jective procedure are of course to be preferred to unilateral coercive action. As a
last resort, however, individual states can take recourse to non-military reprisals.
2. A further precondition for a reprisal is that it may be imposed only after a demand
of rectification has been made. It must be terminated immediately after rectifica-
tion has been provided for.
3. A reprisal must not interfere in interests which are protected by norms of the inter-
national legal ius cogens.
7
9 Cornp. Fischer, supra, note 9, at § 57 para. 44 et seq.
8
0 Id. at para. 48.57
4. Furthermore it must not substantially exceed the previous wrongdoing. The prin-
ciple of proportionality also holds for reprisals.
5. A reprisal may only affect rights and legal interests of the opponent but not those
of third parties.
Each transgression of the reprisal right is a reprisal excess, which in turn is itself an




In case of an environmental treaty a reprisal could therefore be a blocking of con-
tractually fixed financial assistance in response to a violation of legal environmental
norms. In turn, in response to a default on contractually fixed financial assistance a re-
prisal could be the non-observance of contractually fixed environmental standards.
However, it must be borne in mind that the observance of environmental standards is
an obligation vis-a-vis all other parties to the treaty. This obligation may therefore
only be cancelled if all states default on their financial obligations. Otherwise the pre-
condition under 5. would not be met.
3. Evaluation
The sanctions which are admissible under the general international law can be consid-
ered treaty stability elements with respect to violations of international environmental
treaties. In that respect one has to distinguish between information and cooperation
treaties and treaties which set environmental standards. In the case of treaties which
set standards a sanction must not imply the non-observance of the standards, because
this would endanger the objective of the treaty. The possibility to execute a retorsion
or a reprisal outside the treaty can be stabilising in the sense of inducing states to hon-




1 Comp. Heintschel v. Heinegg, supra, note 6, at § 15 para. 86.
8
2 The United States, for instance, have repeatedly induced various states to comply with the
whaling quota of the International Whaling Commission by warning those states according
to the Pelly Amendments and threatening them with sanctions. Comp,, e.g., Wilkinson,
"The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce International Whaling Agreements: A Critical
Perspective", 17 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 211 (1988/89).58
C. Treaty revision and adjustment
Another element of treaty stabilisation, as has been shown, is treaty flexibility.
Contract law in general and, more specifically public international law refers to this
notion. Modifications and alterations of treaties are admissible under certain circum-
stances in order to adapt treaty provisions to changes of the basic circumstances.
1. Principles
Just as in private law the parties to an international treaty can alter the treaty at any
time unanimously.
8
3 The Vienna Convention permits in Part IV Art. 39 in principle
the possibility of alterations of treaties.
A change and modification of treaties is thereby possible in principle and must fulfil
only few preconditions. Some of these are the notification of all parties of the desire to
alter in case of multilateral treaties,
8
4 and the right of each of the other parties to the
treaty to participate in the decision on the new stipulations
8
5 and in the negotiations
and agreement on the decision to alter the treaty
8
6 as well as the right to become a
party to the new treaty
87. A special case is the alteration of a multilateral treaty only
between some parties to the effect of changing the treaty only in between them. This is
feasible if either such a modification in the relation between only some of the parties is
stipulated in the treaty
8
8 or if it is not explicitly ruled out
89, and if the contractual
rights of the other parties
9
0 as well as the objective of the treaty
9
1 are not adversely af-
fected.
8
3 Heintschel v. Heinegg, supra, note 6, at § 13 para. 1.
8
4 Art. 40 (3) VC
8
5 Id. lit. a.
8
6 Id. lit. b.
8
7 Id. para. 3.
8
8 Art. 41 (1) a and (2) VC.
8
9 Id. lit. b.
9
0 Id. lit. b i.
9
1 Id. lit. b ii.59
2. Special rules for treaty revision and adjustment
Similar rules are contained in environmental treaties. For example, such rules are
contained in the treaty on long-range transboundary air pollution of the ECE and its
supplementary protocols.
9
2 The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer of 1985 contains special rules which do not only relate to the Convention itself
but also to the protocols which are to supplement it.
9
3 It also contains a unilateral right
of proposing alterations which is supposed to pay due tribute to specific scientific and
technical considerations.
9
4 The Conference of States Parties to that Convention may
agree on such revision by a qualified majority (3/4 of the present and voting parties for
alterations of the convention,
9
5 2/3 for an alteration of the protocols
96. Such revision is
then proposed to the member states for ratification, approval or acceptance.
9
7
3. The dynamic concept of a treaty in modern international legal procedures
Modern international environmental rules increasingly depart from the idea of a once
and for all, complete and conclusive contractual regulation in favour of a dynamic de-
velopment in which environmental rules materialise in a multi-stage process, which is
often based on so called framework conventions, which provide for general objectives




2 Comp. Art. 12 of the "Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution" of; 1979;
Art. 7 of the "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at
Least 30 Per Cent" of 1985; Art. 6 of the "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-Term Financing of the Co-operative
Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air
Pollutants in Europe" of 1984.
9
3 Art. 9 of the Convention.
9
4 Id. para. 1.
9
5 Id. para. 3
9
6 Id. para. 4.
9
7 Id. para. 3 in fine.
9
8 Comp. the "Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution" of 1979; "Protocol
to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of
Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent" of 1985; "Pro-
tocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-Term
Financing of the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-
Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe" of 1984; "Protocol to the 1979 Conven-
tion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of60
Only at subsequent stages — frequently in the form of supplementary protocols —
will a system of rules be specified and partly be made mandatory. This ongoing nego-
tiation and rule-making process frequently permits by way of acceleration, delay or by
a revision of protocols an adaptation to changing economic and political conditions.
4. Evaluation
To conclude, in principle an alteration of contracts is feasible on the international legal
stage if all parties agree. To the more, by way of specific treaty rules, modifications
and alterations have been made more easy to achieve, e.g. by waiving the unanimity
requirement. To the more, a dynamic design of contractual regimes has furthermore
facilitated to take into account changes of the relevant circumstances.
D. "Monitoring": Supervision and inspections
A further question which emanates from the contractual stabilisation approach relates
to monitoring. Monitoring is very important, because the status of environmental me-
dia and the compliance with standards set for their protection is difficult to verify.
The instrument of monitoring is relatively new in international law. So far it has
been applied in particular in disarmament treaties and in human rights treaties. The
substance of this instrument is a commitment of participating states to either admit ob-
servers on their own territory" or to report themselves
100. In case of disarmament
Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes" of 1988; "Protocol to the 1979 Conven-
tion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of
Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes of 1991; "Convention for the
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution" of 1976; "Protocol for the Preven-
tion of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircrafts" of 1976;
"Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and other Harm-
ful Substances in Cases of Emergency" of 1976; "Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution
of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-based Sources" of 1980; "Protocol
Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas" of 1982.
9
9 Similarly, the provision under V. of the time schedule of 1989 of the "International
Whaling Convention" of 1946, according to which at least two whaling inspectors must be
on each factory vessel, which have to supervise conduct and whaling procedures.
100 Provision VI. No. 25 a of the time schedule of 1989 for the "International Whaling Con-
vention" of 1946, according to which the governments of the member states are obliged
to report to the Whaling Commission, Art. 8 and 9 of the "Convention on Long-Range61
treaties most frequently an outside control is applied. In the area of human rights,
however, upon agreement of the states concerned, independent rapporteurs may be
entrusted with monitoring functions. Often they are empowered to choose whatever in-
formation sources they may deem appropriate. In the area of human rights this proce-
dure proves effective because states at least try to give the impression to the outside
world of sympathising with the human rights idea. Future must show whether in the
realm of environmental law a similar effect occurs.
The basic legal issue in monitoring is that of territorial sovereignty. The principle of
territorial sovereignty means that a state has a sovereign right to control all activities
taking place on its territory. Carrying out inspections on the territory of a state, there-
fore, requires the state's consent.
10
1 This holds true even in the case that a state has ac-
cepted some international obligations. It is a well established principle of international
law that a state may not bar interferences any more on the basis of its sovereign rights
if that state has accepted international obligations in the matter.
10
2 This argument,
however is not understood to go as far as to allow inspection teams to enter the coun-
try without consent. Prior consent of the state concerned, therefore, is required with
the exception of those rather rare cases, where a treaty expressly provides otherwise. A




Transboundary Air Pollution" of 1979, which stipulates an exchange of information and
the establishment of official monitoring stations in accordance with the EMEP.
10
1 No. 13 of the "Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment
Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources" of 1985; Art. 11 of the "Convention for the
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources" of 1974; Art. 10 of the "Con-
vention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution" of 1976; Art. 4 of
the "Protocol Concerning Cooperation and Combatting Pollution of the Mediterranean
Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency" of 1976; Art. 29 of
the "UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage" of 1972.
10
2 Heintschel v. Heinegg, supra, note 6, at § 55 para. 4 et seq.
103 "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent"
of 1985.62
For example the ECE Convention provides for an internationally coordinated meas-
urement and control system.
10
4 Such systems are most important for the detection of
risks, causes and possible solutions in particular in the case of cross-border environ-
mental problems. This is, however, not necessarily associated with an allocation of
duties relating to the supervision of the application and implementation of the treaty.
Such an allocation requires that the nature, extent and frequency of measurements and
their appraisal as well as the dissemination and collection of data have been agreed
upon.105
Therefore, "monitoring" is an element of controlling the compliance with standards
and therefore it serves attaining a treaty's objective by making violations observable
and thus providing for the possibility of reactions.
V. Economic aspects of legal stabilisation mechanisms
From the preceding description of the various treaty enforcement and stabilisation in-
struments it transpires that there are differences between the economic and legal ap-
proach. This section further addresses these differences from the perspective of eco-
nomic theory.
A. Transfers
Transfers are compatible with international legal theory. But it seems very difficult to
identify different kinds of transfers, their magnitude and their purpose. Section IV.A
characterises transfers as deviations from equal contributions of the parties to a com-
mon goal. Equal contributions is a normative concept which is debatable from the
point of view of non-cooperative bargaining theory.
If equal contributions means equal costs (relative to GNP) for each party this
benchmark captures only one side of the story since states will take costs and benefits
10
4 Art. 9 of the "Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution" of 1979.
10
5 No. 11 of the "Montreal Guidelines for Protection of the Marine Environment Against
Pollution from Landbased Sources" of 1985, Protocol I Art. 3 of the "Convention for the
Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific" of 1989.63
into account. Benefits need not accrue to the parties in equal amounts (relative to their
contributions or GNP). Equal net benefits of a cooperative activity can be the result of
a bargaining process between the participating states. The axiomatic Nash bargaining
solution and the strategic Rubinstein solution suggest an even secondary distribution
(equal split) between the parties if those are equal with respect to their outside options
and their discount rates.
10
6 Otherwise the distribution will be biased to the advantage
of the country which has a more favourable outside option and is more patient. If the
original distribution of gains from cooperation do not coincide with the bargaining
outcome transfers must be used to redistribute these gains and achieve the agreed dis-
tribution of net benefits.
In a multilateral CO2 agreement the outside option of parties is particularly impor-
tant for determining transfers. This is the case since parties cannot commit themselves
to cooperative behaviour. In the CO2 game, the non-cooperative benefit of some states
may be larger than their benefit from cooperative abatement if sufficiently many states
already cooperate. This is relevant because — as long as property rights or regulatory
regime for using the global environment do not exist — one must assume that every
sovereign state has the right to appropriate, by action or default, whatever benefit it
can obtain. This is the case for using the atmosphere as a CC>2-deposit and it holds for
the right to appropriate any windfall profits which other countries produce. Therefore,
an obligation to make equal contributions to solve the C02-problem cannot, from the
point of view of economic theory, a priori be the benchmark for determining transfers.
The non-cooperative approach assumes a completely self-interested state which co-
operates only for opportunistic reasons. An opportunistic state may abstain from or
join an abatement coalition and it may defect later without regard to other parties' util-
ity if this fits its interests. Therefore, the net gains from cooperation including transfers
must at least amount to the benefits which a state can secure alone. If in a given situ-
ation the outside option is the superior choice for a state compared to cooperation, the
10
6 Nash, "The Bargaining Problem", 18 Econometrica 155 (1950); Rubinstein, "Perfect
equilibrium in a bargaining model", 50 Econometrica 97 (1982).64
difference between the free-rider utility and this state's benefit from cooperative CO2
abatement defines the lower limit of transfers. This is probably the relevant case for




To take state opportunism as relevant for assessing transfers is in line with interna-
tional law and economic theory. The criterion does not rely on debatable notions of
justice and international equity. It is supported by the observation that CO2 reduction
services must literally be bought in developing countries, e.g., by financing reduction
project through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and joint implementation
schemes or through redistributive CO2 permits or tax schemes.
10
8 These transfers will,
however, not suffice to entice all free-riders to join an efficient CO2 abatement coali-
tion and to comply with the agreement. The funds needed are likely to exceed the
willingness to pay of even a committed abatement coalition, e.g., the OECD.
10
9
Apart from distributing the gains from cooperation, inducing countries to participate
and discouraging treaty violations, transfers can serve several other purposes. E.g.,
they can contain a premium for accepting environmental risks or support countries
which face an environmental disaster or contain an element of development aid. This
does not imply that transfers are necessarily additive.
Contrary to the assessment in Section IV.A, from an economic point of view, many
provisions in international treaties can serve the role of transfers. An obligation of
parties to cooperate by giving technical assistance and exchanging scientific and tech-
nical information cannot readily be recognised as a transfer. Section IV.A.I.a argues
that the resulting advantages are not defined clearly enough to justify a transfer.
10
7 Comparable cases are the desalination of the Rhine and the removal of SOX from British
power plants, which, however, feature mostly unidirectional externalities. For the latter
comp. Maler, "The Acid Rain Game". In: H. Fplmer, E. Ierland (eds.), Valuation
Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics, 1989.
108 Note ^at the GEF and "joint implementation" are transfer instruments which are already
provided for in the Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992. Joint im-
plementation allows states to fulfil their CO2 reduction obligations abroad.
10
9 Comp. Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment, supra, note 29;
Policy Coordination for Sustainability, supra, note 38.65
Cooperation obligations in treaties concern almost exclusively the public sector. It is
obvious that the provision of public goods involves very different costs in different
countries. Sharing these public goods, e.g., scientific information, with other countries
does not involve any significant additional costs. Cooperation in this field improves
global efficiency and can then be dealt with under this aspect. But access to such
goods can also have a great value for some (developing) countries. This can raise their
willingness of complying with a treaty considerably. Thus, under functional aspects
cooperation duties can serve the role of a transfer. They can have an important treaty
stabilising effect, especially when assistance must be given in a crisis situation.
Section IV.A.l.b suggests that reduced environmental obligations cannot be under-
stood as transfers. Differentiated CO2 abatement obligations can in deed be the result
of an efficient cooperative abatement policy. The differences are then motivated by
cost differentials between countries. But different standards can also reflect conces-
sions which are intended to induce parties to join and comply with a treaty. Agreed
abatement below the efficient level in the receiving country and/or inefficiently high
abatement in the donating country can function as a transfer. But as a rule, transfers
should be used to improve efficiency and not to impair it.
Differentiated financial contributions to the financing of international task are not
regarded as transfers in the legal sense (IV.A.l.c). In deed, different contributions
seem to be motivated by general distributional rather than by cost-effectiveness or
treaty stabilisation considerations. If countries benefit in proportion to their GNP from
a common project, making contributions depend on GNP is roughly in line with bar-
gaining theoretic predictions. Other contribution formulas may indicate a different
distribution of project benefits or contain an element of transfers.
Establishing an international fund, which the legal analysis recognises as a transfer
mechanism, is probably the most conclusive form of organising utility transfers in a
multilateral agreement. Which purposes the fund serves depends very much on the
disbursement regulations and practice. In principle, an international fund is very well
suited to stabilise a treaty. First, the incentive to pay agreed transfers into a multilateral
fund is stronger than the incentive to make bilateral transfers. Second, fund contributi-66
ons can be regarded as a bond if the treaty stipulates that a non-compliant country
loses the right to disbursements. The disbursement delay can countervail the delay
with which the international community can react to non-compliance. Third, if funds
are disbursed on the basis of strict conditionality and only for well defined projects of
global interest, they come very close to in-kind transfers. Hence, with regard to treaty
stability the role of an international fund can go much beyond the task of mere project
financing and promoting structural change in the recipient countries.
Section IV.A.2 acknowledges that international transfers outside of environmental
treaties (official development aid, special trade preferences etc.) are essential for treaty
stability. The fact that these transfers are given without a legally binding obligation
ensures that they can effectively be used to stabilise international relations. The fact
that international legal obligations cannot be enforced by a court system requires es-
tablishing relationships of factual instead of contractual dependence. Not legally
binding transfers do just this. They allow to react quickly, more flexibly and often also
more forcefully to a contract violation. External transfers are well suited for stabilising
an agreement exactly because their suspension or termination is credible.
The recent willingness of states to write binding transfer obligations into treaties
need not contradict this. This development may rather indicate a differentiation of
transfers with respect to their purpose. Transfers which directly buy environmental
services, e.g., through funding of CO2 projects by the GEF, are being increasingly ac-
cepted by taxpayers in donor countries. But transfer obligation which only redistribute
the gains from cooperation can hardly be explained to the public. And to contractually
fix (monetary) transfers intended to stabilise a treaty can be counterproductive, since
this impedes the flexibility to react to treaty violations. In addition, transfers which are
contractually linked to a certain treaty cannot be used to stabilise other treaties.
Unlinked transfers are advantageous since different treaties are likely to come under
pressure at different times.
It remains difficult to identify transfers in international treaty relations and to un-
ambiguously assign different tasks to them. Nevertheless, it is clear that transfers have
an important role to play in achieving and stabilising a CO2 agreement.67
B. Sanctions
The economic analysis in Section III suggests that there are two forms of sanctions:
first, measures which directly concern the treaty obligations, e.g., reciprocal non-
compliance or modification of contractual obligations (internal stabilisation), and sec-
ond, measures which concern relations outside of the violated treaty (external stabili-
sation). Internal treaty stabilisation can be identified with the possibility to suspend or
terminate a treaty under international law. External stabilisation refer to retorsions and
reprisals.
The termination of a treaty, as stipulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, is equivalent with the trigger strategy described in Section III.B. But legally,
this instrument does not apply to the case of a multilateral CO2 treaty since the sus-
pension or termination of the treaty would hurt other parties too. This result is in line
with contract theory, but only in so far as the threat with terminating the treaty is not
credible and therefore without effect. But that some reduction in the abatement obliga-
tions of the loyal parties (the matching strategy) should be legally impossible is not
supported by contract theory. On the contrary, a re-adjustment of the treaty obligations
is in the interest of the remaining parties. Whether matching is an effective disincen-
tive depends also on the speed of the reaction. Lengthy decision procedures reduce the
power of this instrument since in the meantime the violator can enjoy the higher free-
rider benefit which emanates from this time-lag. The matching strategy should there-
fore be codified in a CO2 treaty, for instance by making obligations directly depend on
the total number of compliant parties
11
0 or by letting a small commission decide on
the new obligations. If this is not feasible one could give each party the right to claim a
certain revision of the treaty if any party defects.
Retorsions and reprisals are international sanctions in the narrow sense. The legal
distinction between these instruments is not important for the economic analysis. As
above, retorsions and reprisals cannot be used in a multilateral CO2 treaty if they af-
fect the loyal parties too. They can therefore only concern bilateral relationships of
Comp. the stability concept used by Barrett, supra, at note 22.68
parties, as for instance the suspension of funding and development aid or the termina-
tion of trade. As pointed out earlier, the threat with retorsions or reprisals is not always
credible and may then be ineffective. Some techniques to make self-binding threats
were discussed above in Section III.D. From the perspective of contract theory the de-
sirable development in international law is clear: to help reduce or eliminate this
credibility problem.
The principle of proportionality of sanctions is part of international law. Excessive
reprisals are an offence which can be answered by counter-reprisals. From a contract
theoretic perspective proportionality is a questionable criterion if it implies that the
impact of sanctions must not exceed the gains from non-compliance in the case ob-
served. If a treaty violation cannot be detected with certainty or if sanctions are not ab-
solutely credible (i.e. their probability is smaller than one) the expected net benefit of
non-compliance is always positive with sanctions that are proportional in this sense. A
treaty breach can thus not be deterred. Therefore, contract theory suggests that the
principle of proportionality should be interpreted to allow that the impact of sanctions
should match the expected net benefit of any observed violation. Only sanctions that
are punitive in this sense can stabilise an environmental treaty effectively. Hence, par-
ties to a CO2 treaty should agree to sanctions which sufficiently overcompensate the
gains actually realised by the non-compliant party. Agreed punitive sanctions are an
admissible instrument in international treaties.
But punitive sanctions can be difficult to use, too, since they may be less credible,
for instance if they cost more to execute. Increasing the impact of sanctions can even
be counterproductive if this renders their execution so improbable that the expected
impact decreases. This weakens the treaty. Hence, the success of punitive sanctions
depends even more on the ability to make credible threats.
But even absolutely credible sanctions must not be excessive. With excessive
threats an imbalance between parties' interests can develop and build up until the threat
finally loses its effect. When the treaty obligations are then violated a sudden and hefty
re-adjustment of the treaty can become necessary. Shock-like adjustments can, how-
ever, lead to inefficiencies for all parties. They can put the entire treaty at risk. The69
correct design of a sanction threat with respect to its impact and credibility is therefore
most important and critical for the stability of an international CO2 treaty.
C. Treaty revision and adjustments
As was pointed out in Section IV.C, treaty revisions are always possible with the con-
sent of all parties. But they are also permissible between a limited number of parties if
there are no negative effects on the remaining parties. Agreed treaty revisions can thus
be a substitute for automatic re-adjustments of treaty obligations in response to a vio-
lation. This was proposed as a stabilisation instrument in Section III.F above. When
negotiating a treaty revision, procedural regulations, e.g., for treaty cancellation, vot-
ing rules and procedural delays, can play an important role as they can influence the
bargaining power of the parties and determine the outcome of renegotiations.
As was already explained, allowing renegotiations in treaties can induce treaty vio-
lations. Thus, the option to renegotiate can have a destabilising effect. This problem
can, of course, also occur in dynamic agreements. A CO2 treaty should therefore
specify the conditions under which renegotiations and treaty revisions are acceptable.
Furthermore, the treaty should provide for instruments which deter non-compliance
induced by the possibility to renegotiate. There should, for instance, be no room for
renegotiating the abatement obligations of less developed countries in the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer after the industrial countries
have fulfilled their abatement obligations. A compromise between necessary treaty
adjustments and contraproductive renegotiations consists in clearly predefined flexible
treaty obligations, e.g., by indexing environmental standards.
Dynamic treaties are a very interesting development under the aspect of treaty sta-
bilisation. More research appears necessary to better understand the treaty stabilising




1 Comp. the discussion in Section III.F.70
D. Monitoring and dispute settlement
Many provisions in international treaties have the purpose to support the above dis-
cussed enforcement and stabilisation instruments. An important provision in this re-
spect concerns the monitoring of compliance with the agreed obligations. Monitoring
provides information which allows to invoke other stabilisation instruments, e.g. sanc-
tions. In most treaties monitoring is subject to national sovereignty and is usually done
by self-reporting. In-place monitoring by foreign representatives is rarely provided for.
This is a source for cheating that should be overcome. In a CO2 treaty, monitoring
should, e.g., be opened to non-governmental organisations. Compliance reports should
be made public in order to give countries more incentive to care for their reputation. A
loss of trustworthiness amounts to an effective sanction since this can have a negative
influence on present and future public or private international relations, e.g., interna-
tional borrowing or direct investments: The risk premium of an unreliable country is
higher.
Dispute settlement procedures can reinforce the reputation effect. Legal proceedings
at the International Court of Justice raise public awareness. But, of course, a Court
ruling alone is no direct enforcement instruments in international relations unless it is
backed by more forceful instruments to execute it. The same holds for arbitration pro-
cedures and similar dispute settlement provisions. Moreover, such provisions can have
an influence on the application and effect of other stabilisation instruments. For in-
stance, long court proceedings raise the temptation to violate the treaty and subse-
quently strengthen the bargaining power of the non-compliant party.
E. Evaluation
Compared with the great number of international environmental treaties there is rela-
tively little experience with non-compliance and with the use and effectiveness of en-
forcement and stabilisation instruments. One reason may be that most ambitious inter-
national environmental agreements which regulate multilateral externalities are rather
young. Another reason may be that the stipulated environmental targets and individual
parties obligations fall considerably short of the cooperative protection level or that the71
cooperative and non-cooperative solutions are not far apart from each other
112. A still
further reason may be that treaty violations pass unnoticed since they do not evoke any
observable reaction. But the observation of relatively few treaty violations could also
indicate that treaty enforcement and stabilisation is in fact successful. Since it is the
purpose of such provisions to avoid violations the effectiveness of treaty stabilisation
measures is hardly observable. An interesting exception are the treaties on interna-
tional fishing and the protection of endangered species. In these cases, open or covered
treaty violations were observed in the past. An example is the International Whaling
Convention which was repeatedly and successfully enforced by threatening to invoke
sanctions, e.g., by the United States against Japan.
It appears useful to attempt a match of the different motivations for treaty violations
with the most suitable enforcement and stabilisation instrument in each case.
Transfers obviously have a rather limited scope in the case of extensive and ambi-
tious international environmental agreements, e.g., a CO2 treaty. Due to the necessary
large volume of the transfers needed to secure full cooperation in the presence of
strong free-rider incentives, their use is likely to be restricted to promoting the estab-
lishment of the treaty and perhaps to a limited enlargement of the treaty coalition. This
can be done through a multilateral fund which disburses project money. The fact that
such transfers can be motivated with buying environmental services abroad strength-
ens the public willingness to make such transfers. This does not exclude that they can
have a stabilising effect too. Non-financial transfers and issue linking, e.g. trade pref-
erences, are likely to have a somewhat larger scope. This is partly due to the fact that
they cannot readily be recognised as transfers as they do not touch upon financial re-
sources. Differentiated treaty obligations which distract from achieving the cost-effec-
tive outcome should not be used to make utility transfers at all. Hence, transfers should
mainly be employed to reach a cost-effective solution, to guarantee the parties the
utility they would have without a treaty and to redistribute, if necessary, the total co-
11
2 As suggested by Barrett, supra, at note 24.72
operation gains. It will be difficult to go against the total free-rider utility solely with
transfers. This requires sanctions.
Credible sanctions have a much larger stabilisation potential than transfers as they
mainly work with the denial of advantages which increasingly accrue from the grow-
ing worldwide economic integration. Sanctions can therefore be used to fight against
free-riders, where this is legally admissible, and to wipe out the gains a non-compliant
party can obtain by exploiting reaction time-lags and irreversibilities. Sanctions should
be the preferred stabilisation instrument as they work without imposing heavy costs on
the international community as long as they are credible.
Finally, learning effects and other exogenous shifts in the bargaining power of par-
ties should be contained by flexible adjustments of the treaty. Predefined flexibility
and conditional obligations are preferable to spontaneous renegotiations since their
anticipation can motivate violations. Dynamic treaties can provide for an integrated
enforcement and stabilisation regime. But their success largely depends on sophisti-
cated formal and informal behavioural and procedural rules. These rules must guide
the expectations which countries have and must make use of the fact that global envi-
ronmental protection takes place in the framework of infinitely repeated cooperation
between countries in many fields.
The evaluation of the described legal enforcement and stabilisation mechanisms on
the background of contract theory suggests the following: Legal enforcement and
stabilisation mechanisms appear remarkably vague and poorly defined. This leaves a
country uncertain about the transfers it can receive, about the sanctions it must expect
and about the possible treaty adjustments.
Apparently, the preservation of the accepted body of international law and the
achieved state of international cooperation has a high value. But these achievements
are put at risk by using international sanctions. The destructive force of sanctions can
stabilise cooperation, but it can also trigger a vicious circle of non-cooperative actions.
In the language of game theory: If parties make mistakes, a cooperative Nash-equilib-
rium can give way to a non-cooperative equilibrium, from which it is difficult to es-
cape again. This danger can at least partly explain the lack of counter-measures in73
treaties and the legal limits which sanctions must obey, namely the principle of pro-
portionality, the distinction between retorsions and reprisals, the prohibition of treaty
suspension which hurt third parties and the softening effect which sanction provisions
within treaties can have.
The question arises whether the weak legal definition of enforcement and stabilisa-
tion mechanisms in multilateral environmental agreements can be justified under sta-
bility aspects, too. Uncertainty which emanates from the lack of clearly defined en-
forcement and stabilisation mechanisms can be stabilising. This is possible when
reputation strategies are involved, as is apparently the case in international relations.
Furthermore, vagueness permits the fine-tuning of a reaction to the specific situation
so that a violation can be remedied without unnecessarily jeopardising other interna-
tional relations. Additionally, the non-codification of stabilisation instruments allows,
within the limits mentioned above, to employ as counter-measures the entire body of
international relations, which are constantly changing. This is important, because at
different times different counter-measures can deliver a credible threat.
But in multilateral treaties with may participants the observed lack of clearly codi-
fied stabilisation instruments can also have a severe drawback. The reason is that in
such treaties many countries need to agree on the appropriate adjustments and counter-
measures and, moreover, must jointly execute them. There are usually numerous rea-
sons to disagree in a particular non-compliance case, and free-riding on other coun-
tries' enforcement efforts is also tempting. Therefore, it is rather unlikely that decisions
on additional transfers, treaty adjustments or effective sanctions can quickly be taken
and that threats are credible. This view seems to be well supported by the experience
with multilateral actions in many fields, as for instance violations of human rights and
peace keeping.
The hypothesis can therefore not be rejected that the theory of international law
should develop new, more clearly defined and codified enforcement and stabilisation
mechanisms to help the international community cope with the severe non-compliance
incentives which are present in the new and coming, necessarily very ambitious global
environmental regimes. In the concluding Section VI of this paper we show that a joint74
approach by contract theory and international legal theory can produce new proposals
and an advancement in this direction.
VI. Synthesis: A stable CO2 agreement
This section draws conclusions from the above discussion. It presents proposals for
concrete stabilisation mechanisms to be used in or in connection with a future CO2
Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Such stabilisation mecha-
nisms should, in principle, be compatible with economic reasoning and with the estab-
lished principles of international law. In some cases, however, there may he good rea-
sons to deviate from established legal conceptions, whereas in other cases new treaty
stabilisation mechanisms may introduce too much alteration and thus instability into
the existing international legal system and are therefore presently not feasible.
A first conclusion from our examination of stabilisation instruments in international
environmental agreements is the observation that enforcement and stabilisation is a
two-layered affair. It is not sufficient for an agreement to provide for stabilisation in-
struments if these instruments are not enforceable themselves. This is most obvious in
the case of economic sanctions, which must be credible and hence need appropriate
design and institutional backing themselves. But also the promise of transfers needs an
appropriate framing in order to be credible. And flexibility requires that criteria and
procedures are available to assess the situation and defend against abuse. Hence, the
stability of stabilisation mechanisms is of great importance for their success.
As was pointed out in the legal analysis in Section IV, stabilisation mechanisms are
often not codified in a treaty itself, but are based on general international law. One
frequently finds, however, a great number of procedural and institutional rules in such
treaties. These are often subject to fierce controversies in negotiations and constitute
the major part of a treaty's text. Examples embrace the rules and institutions for dis-
bursing funds, monitoring provisions and reporting requirements, non-compliance and
dispute settlement procedures and the like. These institutional and procedural provi-
sions are the basis for the successful application of stabilisation mechanisms of the
kind discussed in this paper. They may therefore be called secondary stabilisation in-75
struments as they enable transfers, sanctions and flexibility mechanisms to work as
stabilisation mechanisms for the treaty. Hence, any, treaty must indeed design them
carefully. They frame the strategies which countries have, given the threat of sanc-
tions, the promise of transfers and the possibility to fulfil obligations flexibly and re-
negotiate.
With this in mind, it is suggested that a stable CO2 agreement should incorporate all
or a selection of the following features:
1. The CO2 treaty should stipulate a high minimum participation requirement to
come into force. This requirement should be stated in terms of the number of
states, their economic weight and the world wide CO2 emissions covered.
Justification: This induces countries, and important countries in particular, to sign
and ratify the treaty, because without their participation abatement obligations will
not or are unlikely to exist, and therefore they will forego any gains from joint co-
operative action. A large number of participating countries yields international
legitimacy to any acts performed under the treaty. A big economic weight of the
abatement coalition enhances her potential for actions like economic sanctions
against non-compliant countries and outsiders. A large total amount of CO2 emis-
sions covered by the treaty guarantees a minimum climate effect of the treaty
without which many countries will have no incentive to participate.
2. Individual states' abatement obligations should match the abatement efforts of
other states. Thus, they should depend positively on the number of signatories or
rather the total amount of CO2 emissions covered by the treaty.
Justification: As this provision shifts abatement upwards as countries join and
downwards as countries defect, it strengthens reciprocity and thus the incentive to
join and comply since joining becomes more profitable and defecting less so. Non-
compliance would thus virtually be punished by a partial suspension of the treaty's
environmental obligations.76
3. A defection penalty or a front end abatement concession should be paid by a non-
compliant country before punishment is lifted and the country is admitted to the
treaty again.
Justification: This provision reduces the exploitable possibility of avoiding pun-
ishment by renegotiating after non-compliance is detected.
4. In principle, abatement and general treaty obligations should not be differenti-
ated between types of countries, except as justified by global efficiency.
Differentiations of obligations motivated by other considerations should be made
explicit as exceptions to the rule.
Justification: This allows to identify differentiations as a form of transfer, which in
turn makes it easier to (re)negotiate them and replace them by alternative, possibly
more efficient, transfer instruments. Equivalent and concomitant obligations
strengthen reciprocity and reduce shifts in bargaining power due to irreversible
treaty fulfilment by one side. This avoids the kind of time inconsistency found in
the Montreal Protocol, in which developing countries enjoy a grace period of ten
years.
5. A global CO2 Fund, possibly within the framework of the Global Environmental
Facilities, should be established. The resources of the Fund should come from at
least the following sources:
• An initial payment by all countries which join the agreement should be trans-
ferred to the Fund. This payment may be substituted by other assets placed in
the custody of the Fund.
Justification: An initial payment serves as collateral.
• Regular contributions by all countries which are a party to the treaty should be
made. The funds should be disbursed to the recipients only with delay.
Contributions by a non-compliant country should be forfeited after its defection.
Non-payment of contribution is considered non-compliance.77
Justification: These rules strengthen the collateral property of the Fund.
Payments are easy to monitor and can be used as an indicator of the willingness
to comply in future rounds.
• Funds generated in connection with the punishment of non-compliant or non-
participating countries, for instance a punitive tariff on trade in CO2 intensive
goods, should be transferred to the Fund.
Justification: This strengthens the justification and enforceability of punish-
ment.
6. The funds should be disbursed in the form of in-kind transfers. Strict condition-
ally and in-place supervision of financed projects should be mandatory.
Irreversible technologies for CO2 reduction options should be financed with pri-
ority.
Justification: In-kind transfers for irreversible projects make non-compliance with
respect to already achieved reductions impossible or less likely.
7. Other forms of bi- and multilateral transfers should be encouraged. They can be
stabilising if they are properly enforced themselves.
o Such transfers may for instance comprise administrative, technical and scien-
tific assistance by more advanced countries.
• An international carbon tax or transferable CO2 permits can — besides improv-
ing the cost-effectiveness of CO2 abatement in the participating countries —
work as a transfer mechanisms. But the distribution of CO2 permits or tax reve-
nues as a means of effecting transfers may alone not contribute much to the
stability of a globally comprehensive CO2 agreement, and may even be desta-
bilising.
Justification: The transfers necessary to bring about efficiency and full coop-
eration can easily exceed the willingness-to-pay of (uncommitted) donor coun-
tries. Only those (possibly inefficiently low) abatement efforts which are in the
interest of the donors can be realised in the recipient countries without weaken-
ing treaty stability on the donors' side. Moreover, international property rights78
(tradeable emission permits) require international enforcement themselves, or
they will not be respected. And international taxes must be collected and tax
obligations be enforced.
8. The CO2 treaty should be linked to other international issues via institutions and
other treaties, such that the participation in other beneficial international activities
can be made conditional on the participation in and compliance with the CO2
treaty. Possible candidates for linking would be trade agreements or treaties on
joint research and development.
Justification: Existing and purpose-built institutions reduce negotiation and trans-
action costs as well as enforcement and stabilisation costs. They facilitate benefi-
cial issue-linking (transfers) or punitive issue-linking (sanctions) thus favouring
participation and compliance and deterring free-riding and non-compliance, A
wide-ranging example for linking strategies is the European Union.
9. The private sector should be involved in stabilising a CO2 treaty by means of
cross default contracts between governments on the one side and industry and
trade on the other side, linking public environmental and private business interests.
The cross, default contract can be made mandatory by the CO2 treaty. An example
is a cross default contract with international banks.
Justification: A cross default contract is equivalent with prespecified sanctions,
except that it is reciprocal in tying both the government (or environmental agency)
and the private sector into enforcing each others interests. The cross default con-
tract itself is enforceable by the domestic court system and can benefit both part-
.• ners. Apart from the possibility of involving the private sector, a cross-default
mechanism can bring about and buttress an issue linking such as is discussed un-
der 8. It need not necessarily involve the private sector.
10. The monitoring of compliance should be permitted on the spot and opened to
non-governmental organisations. Non-compliance reports should be widely pub-
lished.79
Justification: This strengthens self-deterrence of non-compliance as it induces a
loss of confidence in the non-compliant country. It damages the countries interna-
tional repuation and good-will, which can entail a higher risk premium in future
transactions and treaties payable to international business partners and foreign
governments.
11. Treaty obligations should be required to serve directly as or be implemented in
domestic law.
Justification: This strengthens self-deterrence as it allows domestic prosecution of
non-compliance with the international treaty and thus takes the legal system of a
non-compliant country hostage of her international obligations.
12. Appropriate sanctions against non-compliant and, where legally possible, against
non-participating countries should be provided for. They may comprise the sus-
pension of all benefits and advantages granted under the CO2 treaty or independ-
ent thereof, in particular monetary and non-monetary transfers, suitable restrictions
of trade in commodities and services, including financial services, and the sus-
pension of participation in international organisations and treaties and other dip-
lomatic measures. Any threat with sanctions must be made credible by e.g. the
following provisions.
• Parties or non-parties to the treaty which evade the sanctions are to be consid-
ered non-compliant and must then be subject to sanctions themselves.
Justification: Such a system of mutually supportive sanctions is credible pro-
vided the number and economic weight of the states parties to the treaty is suf-
ficiently big. Actually imposing the required sanctions is then the best option
for each country taken individually since otherwise it would have to face sanc-
tions itself. Thus, sanctions have maximum effect as every country participates.
This strategy can also be used to extend the CO2 treaty coalition. It was appar-
ently used in the Montreal Protocol.80
• The CO2 Fund, in particular the contributions of and the funds earmarked for
the non-compliant country, should be used to compensate compliant countries
for their costs of imposing sanctions.
Justification: This renders sanctions more credible since with compensations
countries taken individually do not lose from participating in sanctions. Truly
credible and fully deterrent sanctions leave the fund untouched.
• The execution of sanctions should, as far as possible, involve and be delegated
to international institution, preferably those which possess and can orchestrate
their own means of sanctions, e.g., the World Bank, which can suspend loans,
project financing, consulting etc. Under uncertainty, this institution can build up
reputation by executing sanctions.
Justification: Delegation and reputation strengthen the threat of sanctions in that
they are credible commitments.
13. The impact of sanctions should match the expected benefit of treaty violations and
free-riding in each case. An international authority should set punitive sanctions
if monitoring is not perfect. The members of the sanctions authority must be
known to be tough, e.g. representatives of countries which suffer heavily under
climate change.
Justification: Only sanctions of a sufficient impact can deter not fully observable
treaty violations. The necessary intensity of sanctions and the means to achieve it
cannot be prespecified for each case with sufficient precision. Hence, the deter-
rence effect must be based on the reputation for toughness and good judgement of
the sanctions authority.
14. The CO2 abatement obligations should be kept flexible by indexing them to rele-
vant exogenous variables or by allowing certain deviations which should, how-
ever, be banked for later compensation. Flexibility needs clear criteria and super-
vision. Moral hazard needs to be contained.81
Justification: Flexibility alleviates the burden from a country for some time thus
allowing for an alternative to outright non-compliance. Flexibility rules must be
kept under tight control in order to prevent abuse and concealed non-compliance.
15. The renegotiation of existing obligations should be restrained to cases which are
justified by new and unexpected information. Renegotiations should always be
placed in the framework of a general review of the treaty.
Justification: A too extensive possibility to renegotiate can be destabilising as it
invites violations. The prospect of easy renegotiations may weaken the treaty as it
entices opportunistic countries to join, whereas more committed countries will an-
ticipate violations and opportunistic attempts to renegotiate and thus lose interest.
16. The CO2 treaty should be a dynamic regime. That is, it should be established as a
rule-driven, stepwise process of setting and implementing ever stricter abatement
obligations and accompanying regulations.
Justification: Dynamic agreements offer each participant the chance to additional
benefits with each (irreversible) step. Non-compliance would seriously disturb or
interrupt this process. Additionally, the general amendments and adjustments to a
dynamic treaty can correct unfavourable developments without touching upon
previous obligations and achievements. In this respect, the Vienna Convention on
the Protection of the Ozone Layer supplemented by the Montreal Protocol with its
repeated adjustments and amendments is an example for a global CO2 treaty.
The above list of treaty stabilising features, which is certainly not exhaustive, con-
tains suggestions to by employed in a CO2 treaty, for drafting other new treaties or
amending existing ones. In doing so, states are, in general, free to draft and conclude
whatever rules they may deem appropriate and politically feasible. Most cf the rec-
ommendations made are therefore permissible under international law.
There are, however, some limitations since states are obliged to observe those inter-
national law rules and entitlements they are not competent to modify or otherwise to
interfere with. A coalition of states may agree upon a wide variety of obligations,
sanctions, transfers and benefits to be applied and provided for among themselves.82
Problems arise, however, when interests and rights of states are concerned, which are
not participating. It is a fundamental principle of law in general that no treaty provi-
sion is allowed which impairs rights and legal interests of third parties. There are few
exceptions to this principle, as sometimes international treaty law may have a so-called
erga omnes effect. Those limitations must be observed in the recommendations on is-
sue linking (8.), cross-default contracts (9.) and sanctions (12.) above.
Establishing links (e.g. through cross-default contracts) between otherwise separate
issues is admissible in the whole range of international relations, provided it is not
foreclosed by binding international law obligations. To do so, all requirements for the
modification of a specific obligation have to be met. Such modifications may theoreti-
cally be incorporated in a new international CO2 treaty, provided that the parties to the
treaty are competent to amend those other legal obligation. If this is not the case those
modifications must be concluded according to the rules provided for in the relevant
treaties or conventions concerned.
Trade concessions and preferences are negotiated by a great number of states under
GATT, the Generalised System of Preferences, the Caribbean Basin Initiative or the
Lome System and are legally binding. They thus can only be modified by all states
concerned. If not all states participate in the proposed CO2 agreement those modifica-
tions have to be tabled at the respective negotiation rounds, which periodically take
place to review those trade agreements.
The granting of funds and the financing of international development assistance is
based on far less strict legal rules. In deciding about new projects, links may be estab-
lished as permitted by the relevant programme. World Bank or UN financed projects
are often granted subject to the willingness of states to accept additional environmental
obligations. Linking project finance to issues not directly related to the project is not
easy under the existing programmes. It may require to establish new terms and condi-
tions for project funding which take broader issue linking into account.
Also the proposal to impose sanctions on non-participating states (12.) raises legal
concerns. The term sanctions is ambiguous in legal perspective. Sanctions may have a
mere political impact (retorsion) and in this case they are admissible without limits.83
But if they impair interests recognised and relevant under international law (reprisals)
they are clearly illegal. Trade sanctions against non-parties, for instance, will be
widely inadmissible as far as they concern binding GATT obligations.
The recommendation to implement international legal obligations into national law
(11.) points to an important deficit. The proper implementation of international envi-
ronmental law obligations is a growing concern. Two different kinds of international
obligations must be distinguished with respect to their implementation in national law.
Some international law obligations are drafted in a way that they can be directly ap-
plied as part of the national law. This is the case if they are directly addressed to indi-
viduals and are meaningful in this regard. Standards for maximum individual exposure
to environmental effects, individual rights to review administrative decisions in na-
tional and foreign courts and individual rights to compensation belong to this category.
Such international law obligations may be transferred to national law just as they
stand.
Other international law provisions which primarily address the states and their
authorities require national decisions. A general CO2 abatement objective for a whole
state will not be meaningful to individuals of that state if embodied literally in the na-
tional legal order. The states addressed by such obligation have to consider which kind
of policies to implement in order to meet their international duties. Means and
mechanisms to be applied may be prescribed by international law, but more often in-
ternational treaty law is tacit in this regard. The recommendation to oblige states to
conclude cross-default agreements with their national industries (13.) may be such a
prescription of the means to be adopted by states in order to implement their interna-
tional obligations.
Some of the proposals mentioned in this final chapter seem to warrant further legal
and economic research, particularly in the two fields of applying sanctions and linking
strategies to enforce and stabilise global environmental agreements.
The possibilities to apply sanctions against both participants and non-participants to
an international CO2 agreement should be further studied. Most important are ques-
tions which pertain to the use of sanctions in relation to the international trading and84
legal systems. The aim of such research should be to reconcile the beneficial potential
of sanctions as stabilisation instrument in dealing with global environmental problems
and their potentially destabilising effect on the international economic and legal sys-
tems. Particular questions would be how the policy of treaty stabilising sanctions can
be administered by the GATT or the new World Trade Organisation (WTO) and
whether an objective climate regime can be established and legally justified which al-
lows to use sanctions against states which do not participate in it.
Equally important further research concerns the various integration strategies as
they create interdependence between states by linking otherwise separate international
issues. How issue linking can best be organised, which roles institutions and treaties
can play in the joint management of the international commons in relation to other in-
ternational tasks, how such integration can be extended to all states and how national
and international law and policies and how the public and private sector should inter-
act to guarantee the stability of both the ecological and the human-built systems, these
are relevant questions for legal and economic research warranting further joint efforts.
Another, not less interesting task would be to further clarify the role of institutional
and procedural rules in international treaties, as, for instance, dispute settlement pro-
cedures, in their capacity to support the enforcement and stability characteristics of
such treaties and buttress the enforcement and stabilisation instruments that were dis-
cussed in this paper.